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Web-based applications and services are increasingly being used in security-
sensitive tasks. Current security protocols rely on two crucial assumptions to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of information:  First, they assume that end-point software 
used to handle security-sensitive information is free from vulnerabilities. Secondly, these 
protocols assume point-to-point communication between a client and a service provider. 
However, these assumptions do not hold true with large and complex vulnerable end 
point software such as the Internet browser or web services middleware or in web service 
compositions where there can be multiple value-adding service providers interposed 
between a client and the original service provider. 
To address the problem of large and complex end-point software, we present the 
AppCore approach which uses manual analysis of information flow, as opposed to purely 
automated approaches, to split existing software into two parts: a simplified trusted part 
that handles security-sensitive information and a legacy, untrusted part that handles non-
sensitive information without access to sensitive information. Not only does this 
approach avoid many common and well-known vulnerabilities in the legacy software that 
compromised sensitive information, it also greatly reduces the size and complexity of the 
trusted code, thereby making exhaustive testing or formal analysis more feasible. We 
demonstrate the feasibility of the AppCore approach by constructing AppCores for two 
real-world applications: a client-side AppCore for https-based applications and an 
AppCore for web service platforms. Our evaluation shows that security improvements 
and complexity reductions (over a factor of five) can be attained with minimal 
modifications to existing software (a few tens of lines of code, and proxy settings of a 
browser) and an acceptable performance overhead (a few percent).  
 
xiii 
To protect the communication of sensitive information between the clients and 
service providers in web service compositions, we present an end-to-end security 
framework called WS-FESec that provides end-to-end security properties even in the 
presence of misbehaving intermediate services. We show that WS-FESec is flexible 
enough to support the lattice model of secure information flow and it guarantees precise 
security properties for each component service at a modest cost of a few milliseconds per 




CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Web-based applications are increasingly being used to perform security-sensitive 
tasks. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that online retail sales generated over 110 
billion dollars in revenue in 2006 [26]. It also estimates that e-commerce sales are 
growing at the rate of around 20% every year. According to a comScore Inc. study [6], 
nearly 40 million people in the U.S. used online banking services in 2005. The growing 
popularity of online applications has also resulted in increasing online fraud. A 
CyberSource study [7] reports that online fraud resulted in losses over $ 2.8 billion in 
2005. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of web-based applications. One variation from 
traditional web-based applications is the presence of more than one service provider for a 
single application. This situation arises in the domain of Service Oriented Computing 
(SOC), where standards such as SOAP and WSDL have facilitated the development of 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Web-Based Applications. In a traditional application, there 
is a single service provider processing a request. Web Service compositions typically 
have more than one service provider processing a request. 
 
2 
composite applications, called web service compositions, where service providers 
provide value added services by aggregating, filtering or annotating content from other 
service providers. A web-based application involves exchange of information between 
the end-user and the various service providers. In applications such as electronic 
commerce or online banking, a part of this information is deemed as security-sensitive 
and hence has to be protected from modification or unauthorized access.  
Maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information requires an 
end-to-end protection mechanism, where the ends are the end-user and the service 
provider. From the figure, we see that protection mechanism not only has to deal with 
attacks on the network, it also has to deal with attacks on end-point software stacks and 
misbehaving intermediate service providers. 
1.1. Terms and Definitions 
This dissertation deals with the following security requirements of web-based 
applications:  
• Integrity: Only authorized entities can modify data or any modifications by 
unauthorized entities can be detected. 
• Non Repudiation of Origin: The originator of the message is prevented from 
denying having sent the message. 
• Confidentiality: Only authorized entities have access to data. 
• Confinement: Data is distributed only to authorized entities.  
In an interaction between a client and a server, any data item that requires one of 
the above defined security properties to hold is termed as a sensitive data item.  
• Trust: Trust in a service is the expectation of a client that the service provides 
the above defined security properties for all its sensitive data items. An expanded trust 
model for web services, as defined in Hoffman et al. [71], relies on additional properties 
like usability, privacy, availability and reliability, audit and verification, user expectation 
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and feedback from the clients. As a starting point, we limit the definition of trust to 
satisfaction of security requirements. 
System components are broadly classified into two categories: Trusted 
Components and Untrusted Components. Trusted components are entities that act in a 
trustworthy manner, i.e., they do not modify data inappropriately, they do not reveal data 
to unauthorized entities, and they perform their tasks correctly. We further assume that 
trusted components cannot be compromised. On the other hand, the behavior of untrusted 
components is not constrained in any way. However, in some instances, the behavior of 
untrusted components can be controlled by trusted components, so as to minimize the 
damage due to misbehaving components, e.g., sandboxing untrusted components. 
From their respective definitions, it is clear that only trusted components should 
handle sensitive data items in their plain text or unprotected representations. Therefore, 
we would like to minimize the size and complexity of such components in an attempt to 
reduce the attack profile of the application and facilitate exhaustive testing or formal 
verification. Generally, untrusted components cannot be allowed access to sensitive data. 
However, untrusted components can access sensitive data that is protected with the help 
of trusted wrappers. Trusted wrappers are components that allow the reuse of untrusted 
components without compromising security objectives, e.g., SSL is a trusted wrapper that 
allows the use of an untrusted Internet to exchange information. 
1.2. Security Problems in Web-Based Applications  
Security protocols such as SSL [61], TLS [53], https [94] and WS-Security [15] 
have been developed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information 
in web-based applications. These protocols protect data flow from the client machine to 
the server machine and vice versa, in the process assuming that the client and server 
software are trustworthy. The security protocols, except for WS-Security, provide coarse-
grained, point-to-point protection, which is inadequate in the presence of intermediate 
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services. WS-Security, though designed with web service compositions in mind does not 
address end-to-end security issues, especially in the open environment envisioned by 
SOC. 
1.2.1. Vulnerable End-Point Software 
End-points in the current system, both the client and the server, run large and 
complex software that suffer from multiple vulnerabilities. On the client side, the Internet 
browser is commonly used to carry out security sensitive tasks such as performing e-
commerce transactions and online banking. A full-fledged web browser is a large piece of 
software and is capable for performing a large number of tasks, e.g., the Mozilla browser 
contains over 1 million lines of code (LOC) and it can browse http, https sites and local 
filesystems. With appropriate plugins, it can also play multiple formats of audio and 
video. The browser suffers from multiple vulnerabilities including arbitrary code 
execution, information leak vulnerabilities and security system bypass [21][22]. 
Attackers have exploited these vulnerabilities in a variety of ways: installing extensions 
that snoop for logins and passwords to online banking sites [34] and compromising 
browsers’ security features like the yellow lock symbol to carry out phishing attacks [23]. 
In addition, several other attacks have been demonstrated that allows an attacker to trick 
the user into uploading sensitive files [22], execute arbitrary code and bypass security 
restrictions like Zones in Internet Explorer [21]. 
With the rise in popularity of web services, web service platforms like Axis, 
Microsoft .NET, IBM Websphere, JBoss are being used on both the server and client 
ends to support web services. These web service platforms typically implement the web 
services framework as specified by W3C [30]. This includes basic messaging 
functionality and support for critical extensions like WS-Addressing, WS-Security. In 
addition, they also provide support for programmer defined extensions for logging, 
admission control or load balancing. Implementing all these functionalities have resulted 
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in a single, large multi-threaded middleware that is difficult to test or verify. For 
example, Axis2 contains about 23,000 LOC. In addition, Axis2 has to rely on external 
libraries for supporting extensions such as WS-ResourceFramework (20,000 LOC), WS-
ReliableMessaging (11,000 LOC) amongst others. Axis2 also provides support for 
programmer defined extensions which can be instantiated, unloaded or reloaded at 
runtime. Web service platforms suffer from multiple vulnerabilities which allow an 
attacker to inject arbitrary code or bypass security mechanisms [19][20]. These 
vulnerabilities allow an attacker to gain access to sensitive data or modify system settings 
on the server and gain control of the platform. 
1.2.2. Misbehaving Intermediate Services 
Web service compositions introduce two challenges to end-to-end integrity and 
confidentiality. First, intermediate services in a composition are selectively allowed to 
look at or modify the results of the data producing web services. While this enables 
value-adding transformations like annotation, filtering, or translation, final data 
consumers will have to trust these intermediate services to maintain the integrity of 
content. 
Secondly, web services operate in an open environment, i.e., (a) there are a large 
number of service providers on the Internet and (b) service providers operate at different 
levels of trust. One can assume transitivity and trust the next web service in the chain of 
invocation but given the large number of services on the Internet, and the various 
permutations and combinations in the way they are composed, “full transitivity” is not a 
feasible or a scalable alternative. On the other hand, for the same reasons, it is also not 
feasible to expect a data consumer to trust, or even be aware of all component services 
used in composing a particular result. Operating in an open environment also implies that 
services in a composition often operate at different security levels with respect to the data 
producing services. The confidentiality policy of a data producing web service dictates 
 
6 
the visibility of its information. Hence, all components of a message should not be 
available to all services in a composition.  
Security protocols such as SSL and TLS are coarse-grained. They provide 
complete access to message contents to intermediate service and hence, misbehaving 
services can compromise the confidentiality or integrity of sensitive information. WS-
Security provides support for fine-grained encryption and signatures; however, it does not 
address end-to-end security issues in open environments. For example, we present an 
electronic prescription system (Section 5.1.2) where the originator of sensitive 
information does not know of all potential recipients at message generation time and 
currently, WS-Security does not provide mechanisms to address this issue.  
1.3. Thesis Statement and Contributions 
This dissertation addresses challenges discussed in Section 1.1 in providing end-
to-end security in web-based applications. The main thesis of this dissertation is that 
improving end-to-end security properties of information flow in web-based applications 
requires small and simple end-point software and extensions to existing security 
protocols that account for the new class of loosely-coupled composite applications. 
Towards this end, this dissertation makes the following contributions: 
• First, to counter the problem of large and complex end point software, we 
present the AppCore approach [106] which uses manual analysis of information flow to 
split existing software into two parts: a small and simple trusted part that handles 
security-sensitive information and a legacy, untrusted part that handles non-sensitive 
information without access to sensitive information. This isolation of sensitive 
information avoids many common and well-known vulnerabilities in the legacy software 
that compromised sensitive information. Additionally, the AppCore approach also greatly 
reduces the size and complexity of the trusted code, thereby making exhaustive testing or 
formal analysis more feasible. The AppCore approach also supports the reuse of non-
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sensitive legacy interfaces at user, programming and remote access levels, minimizing 
user discomfort and changes to existing software. 
• Second, we demonstrate the practical feasibility of the AppCore approach by 
constructing AppCores for two real-world applications: a client-side AppCore for https-
based applications [104] and a server-side AppCore for web service platforms (WSPs) 
[107]. The client-side AppCore uses an https proxy and a small and simple trusted viewer 
to handle sensitive information such as passwords, with a legacy browser handling non-
sensitive other information. The server-side AppCore carries out secure processing of 
sensitive information and the legacy WSP performs the bulk of web service functionality. 
In each case, sensitive information is only accessible by a small and simple AppCore 
(over a factor of five reduction in software complexity), thereby protecting sensitive 
information from common vulnerabilities in the legacy software. Our evaluation shows 
that these security improvements can be attained with minimal modifications to existing 
software (a few tens of lines of code, and proxy settings of a browser) and an acceptable 
performance overhead (a few percent). 
• Third, to protect the communication of sensitive information between the 
clients and service providers in web service compositions, we present an end-to-end 
security framework called WS-FESec [105]. WS-FESec uses fine-grained signatures and 
encryption in conjunction with developer input on security requirements of various parts 
of the message to provide end-to-end security in a loosely-coupled, open environment. 
We show that WS-FESec is flexible enough to support the lattice model of secure 
information flow and it guarantees precise security properties for each component service 
at a modest cost of a few milliseconds per signature or encrypted field. 
1.4. Organization 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
AppCore approach to building small and simple components to handle security-sensitive 
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data. Section 2 also briefly describes the construction and implementation of a simple 
AppCore for e-commerce transaction client. Sections 3 and 4 discuss in detail the design 
and construction of AppCores for https-based client-side software and web service 
platforms. Each section also evaluates the AppCores according to the design goals laid 
out in Section 2. Section 5 discusses the WS-FESec, a fine-grained, end-to-end security 
framework for maintaining confidentiality and integrity in web service compositions. The 
section also describes how WS-FESec can be used to support the lattice model of 
information flow and satisfy the security requirements of the electronic prescription 
system. Section 6 discusses the related work and Section 7 concludes the dissertation and 
discusses future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE APPCORE APPROACH 
 
The large size and high complexity of end-point software in security-sensitive 
applications has hindered their testability and resulted in systems with multiple security 
vulnerabilities. To combat this problem, we present the AppCore approach that refactors 
existing software into two parts: a small and simple part, called the AppCore, operating 
on security-sensitive data items and the rest of the legacy software that is used for all 
other operations. We expect the AppCore to be smaller and simple than the original 
software, thereby simplifying the analysis and testing process. At the same time, by 
reusing the legacy software to operate on security-insensitive data, we expect to reuse 
legacy code and interfaces. 
We first discuss information flow in web-based applications and present the 
reasoning for refactoring software. Next we present an overview of the AppCore 
approach and the design goals for constructing AppCores. Then, we discuss the process 
of AppCore construction and present our evaluation methodology. Finally, we discuss the 
applications of the AppCore approach. We present a detailed example of an AppCore for 
an e-commerce transaction client and discuss the general applicability of the AppCore 
approach.   
2.1. Information Flow in Web-based Applications 
The selective use of security protocols like SSL in interactions between servers 
and clients indicates that information flow in web-based applications consists of atleast 
two distinct classes of data items: security-sensitive and security-insensitive. However, 
this distinction is not propagated to the middleware or the application layer. The same 
software is typically used to handle both classes of data. Therefore any vulnerability in 
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the software, irrespective of whether or not the vulnerable component needs access to 
security-sensitive data, can be used to compromise security-sensitive data, e.g., by 
exploiting a vulnerability in compressed HTML module in Internet explorer, an attacker 
installed a browser help object that sniffs for passwords for online banking sites before 
they can be encrypted with SSL/TLS [34]. 
Not all components of an application are essential to maintaining the 
confidentiality and integrity of information flow. Components are security-insensitive 
because of one of two reasons: first, these components are not involved in processing 
security-sensitive information, e.g., plugins or extensions to browsers are typically not 
invoked during a security-sensitive operation like online banking. Secondly, these 
components only process protected security-sensitive information, e.g., the HTTP 
protocol implementation in browsers and web service platforms process security-
sensitive information, after they have been encrypted with SSL, TLS or WS-Security. 
Therefore, these components are not essential to maintaining the confidentiality or 
integrity of information flows. 
There are two advantages to isolating components that handle security-sensitive 
data items in a small application that executes in a separate protection domain from the 
rest of the application: first, by limiting flow of security-sensitive data items to the small 
application, vulnerabilities in the rest of the application can no longer be used to 
compromise security-sensitive data items. Secondly, we reduce the size and complexity 
of software that has access to security-sensitive data. This makes the software more 
amenable to exhaustive testing and formal verification.  
2.2. Overview of the AppCore Approach 
The AppCore approach recognizes that not all components of an application are 
essential to maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of information flow. Currently, 
we assume that information flow in web applications is composed of two classes of data 
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items: security-sensitive and security-insensitive data items. Security-sensitive data items 
can be downgraded into security-insensitive data items via trusted wrappers. Trusted 
wrappers are components that allow the reuse of untrusted components without 
compromising confidentiality and integrity objectives. Trusted wrappers implement 
downgrading operations such as digital signatures, encryption and down sampling (e.g., 
down sampling of multimedia, one bit result of a comparison of secure password and 
untrusted input). 
Components that require access to security-sensitive data items are called as 
trusted components. These components will have to be trusted as they can modify 
sensitive data items before they can be protected with trusted wrappers. These 
components are extracted from the original application and composed into an AppCore. 
The rest of the application is denoted as untrusted and is modified to invoke the AppCore 
for operating on security-sensitive data items. The AppCore is then executed in a separate 
protection domain from the rest of the application. 
2.2.1. Design Goals 
The construction of AppCores must take into account the following design goals:  
1. Limit flow of Security-Sensitive Information to Trusted Components: This 
is the key security requirement that drives the construction of AppCores. However, note 
that untrusted components can be allowed access to protected security-sensitive 
information through the use of trusted wrappers. 
2. Minimize size and complexity of Trusted Components: Reducing the size 
and complexity of security-sensitive components makes the code more amenable to 
exhaustive testing or formal verification. 
3. Allow use of legacy software for security-insensitive tasks: Using the 
legacy application with its familiar user-interface for security-insensitive tasks minimizes 
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discomfort for the end-user. By using legacy software for security-insensitive tasks, 
developers and users have access to the complete set of features of the original software.  
4. Reuse interfaces as far as possible: Since both the AppCore and the 
untrusted software will be involved in performing a task, they have to communicate with 
each other. Reusing existing interfaces allows for the AppCore to be easily integrated 
with the rest of the application. In the case that the AppCore has to interact with a remote 
entity, conforming to existing interfaces (e.g., SOAP over HTTP for web service 
platforms) allows AppCores to interoperate with legacy entities. 
5. Minimize Performance Loss: Since our restructuring results in two sets of 
components (one trusted AppCore and the untrusted application) coordinating with each 
other to perform a task that was previously accomplished using a single set of 
components, there will be additional costs for communication and coordination. These 
overheads should be minimized to make AppCores viable. 
2.3. Constructing AppCores 
The process of extracting an AppCore from an existing application can be broadly 
divided into three stages: (1) analysis of the application to identify trusted components, 
(2) extracting the identified components and composing them into an AppCore and (3) 
modifying the original application to use the AppCore for security sensitive tasks. 
The function of the analysis stage is to identify components that handle security-
sensitive data items. If the application has reasonable documentation, this step can be 
accomplished by analyzing the documentation, e.g., the Mozilla browser for the e-
commerce transaction client scenario (Section 2.6.1.1) is well documented and has 
clearly-defined modules making identification easier. Otherwise, we have to manually 
identify security-sensitive data items based on domain knowledge (e.g., private keys, 
password). Once identified, dataflow analysis can be used to track the flow of security-
sensitive data items through the application (one such approach is discussed in [41]).  
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In the next stage, we extract the security-sensitive components and integrate them 
into a standalone AppCore. There are two factors that control component integration: 
First, to the greatest extent possible, we want to reuse the interfaces between the security-
sensitive components and the rest of the application, and second, we want to constrain the 
security-sensitive components to perform only the requisite security-sensitive tasks. 
Reusing existing interfaces simplifies the reintegration of the AppCore with the 
application. Constraining security-sensitive components involves modifying or rewriting 
components to perform the necessary security-sensitive task with least amount of 
software, e.g., substituting Mozilla’s NSS module with a bare-bones SSL library, 
MatrixSSL, provides size savings over two orders of magnitude. However, this could also 
break existing interfaces and increase the cost of reintegration. Thus we have two 
conflicting factors influencing component integration.   
The final stage consists of going through the components in the original 
application and replacing the existing function calls to security-sensitive modules with 
calls to the new AppCore. If the original application has an extension architecture (e.g., 
browsers and web service platforms), this is a straightforward process as we can connect 
the application to the AppCore using extensions. 
2.4. Hardware Requirements 
Even though, we prescribe the use of AppCores to perform security-sensitive 
tasks, an attacker can employ interface spoofing attacks to trick an end-user into 
interacting with an untrusted application instead of the corresponding AppCore. 
Similarly, a remote entity can be tricked into revealing sensitive information to an 
untrusted application. The AppCore approach relies on hardware support as described in 
the specifications of the Trusted Computing Group [25][24] to limit flow of security-
sensitive information. Specifically, it relies on authenticated booting to establish a chain 
of authentication for the executing software. The authentication chain can be used to 
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reassure a remote party about the application being executed (remote attestation). 
Locally, a user can compare the chain of trust with a secure copy (e.g., a copy on a USB 
key) before logging into the system. Once logged in, the window manger (a trusted 
component) uses the chain of trust to inform the user about the trustworthiness of the in-
focus application. Sealed storage protects the confidentiality of the cryptographic keys 
that are foundations for the security of the rest of the system.  
2.5. Evaluating AppCores 
We evaluate AppCores along the lines of the design goals mentioned in Section 
2.2.1. The goal of our evaluation is to show that the security improvements compare 
favorably with the performance overheads imposed by the AppCore. We evaluate the 
performance impact of AppCores by building a prototype system and running appropriate 
micro and macro benchmarks. Based on the design of each AppCore, we present 
arguments as to how we restrict the flow of sensitive information to the Trusted 
Components. We also show that the AppCore is invoked only when operating on 
sensitive data, thereby allowing the reuse of legacy interfaces and components. 
In addition to the qualitative arguments describing security improvements, we 
also present quantitative arguments concerning the reduction in software complexity of 
Trusted Components. We use two well known software complexity metrics - Source 
Lines of Code (LOC), and McCabe’s complexity metric (MCC) [85] to illustrate the 
reduction in software complexity. Many software engineering studies have shown that the 
LOC metric is roughly correlated with the number of defects [61][103], which may be 
relatively imprecise, but serves as a useful baseline measure [37]. MCC is based on 
McCabe’s definition [85] of a control flow complexity metric.  It is measured per 
function and it gives the number of distinct execution paths in a given function. 
Intuitively, it represents the minimum number of tests that need to be carried out on that 
function to verify control flow properties. 
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2.6. Applications of the AppCore Approach 
The next two chapters provide detailed examples of the AppCore approach, one 
for a client-side application and another for web service platforms, which is an integral 
part of the software stack on both the client and the server sides. In this section, we 
discuss the broad applicability of AppCore approach based on our work [106] and 
examples from closely related work by others.  
2.6.1. A Simple AppCore for an E-Commerce Transaction Client 
The most popular tool for carrying out an e-commerce transaction is a browser. 
Browsers perform two critical functions for e-commerce – they display content, in a 
format determined by the merchant, to the user and they accept user input and pass them 
along to the merchant. Data transfers can be protected using a transport layer security 
protocol like SSL or TLS. In a typical e-commerce transaction, initially, the customer 
builds up a shopping cart, which can involve multiple rounds of merchant-customer 
interaction. Next, the customer decides to finalize the transaction. At this point most 
merchants use a transport layer security protocol to protect any further communication. 
Once a secure layer has been established, the customer provides the merchant with 
payment information or unique login information to retrieve a profile. The merchant 
verifies this information and finalizes the transaction.  
The large code base of browsers and the support for extensions via tightly 
integrated (i.e. executing in the same address-space) plugins hinder effective testing of 
browsers. Browsers are sources of multiple vulnerabilities including arbitrary code 
execution and security bypass [21][22]. Browsers also suffer from spoofing 
vulnerabilities where the attacker is able to fool the user into mistaking an arbitrary site 
for a trusted site. Attackers have successfully exploited these vulnerabilities to install 
malicious plugins, and steal private information like passwords and credit card 
information. These vulnerabilities illustrate the risk in using a browser to carry out 
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security-sensitive operations like online purchases. On the other hand, since a majority of 
merchants and consumers prefer to use the browser as a transaction tool, an effective 
solution must work within the framework of the browser. 
2.6.1.1 Components of the AppCore 
The security-sensitive data in an e-commerce transaction client is the user’s 
payment and shipping information, the shopping cart that is displayed to the user, and the 
user’s choice about the transaction. Upon analysis of the browser’s components (listed in 
Table 1), we find that the following components are security-sensitive: the main browser, 
which contains the parser, the display, the security library and basic user-interface 
components. These components form a significant portion (over 50%, 500 KLOC) of the 
browser’s code base. Composing them into an AppCore would result in a trusted 
application smaller than the original browser, but we can achieve better results by 
refining the selected components. We simplify the selected components by limiting their 
functionality. For example, constraining the language describing the shopping cart would 
allow for a smaller parser and display interface.  Similarly, implementing only the most 
Table 1: Modules in the Mozilla Browser [14] 
Type Example Modules 
Main Browser Browser, Portable Runtime, Display Widgets, New 
HTML Parser. 
Security Security (NSS & JSS). 
Scripting Javascript Engine, Rhino, Live Connect. 
Security-Extras Personal Security Manager, JS Security. 
UI-Enhancements Clipping & Compositing, Find as you type, ImageLib, 
accessibility. 
Parsing-Extras RDF, DOM, XML, XSLT, MathML. 





used cryptographic mechanisms would significantly reduce the size of the security 
library. We now consider these components in more detail. 
Browser Parser. This browser component has to understand a variety of HTML 
and XML standards with multiple variants.  A shopping cart, for example, can be 
described in detail using sophisticated tags and templates.  While this is an expected good 
usability feature, it introduces potential vulnerabilities due to growing code size. A cart 
described using the table tags in HTML would require a small and specialized parser. As 
shown in Section 2.6.1.3, this specialization helps us achieve significant reductions in the 
code size and complexity of the AppCore. 
User Interface. There are many demands on a generic web browser; their 
functionality has to include the display of text and images in multiple formats, support 
novelties such as tabbed browsing and skins, etc. In contrast, a small interface designed 
for a shopping cart would focus on the unambiguous display of the cart content and a 
clear way to accept or decline the transaction.  Our AppCore uses a text-box-based 
interface that displays the table and presents the user with a confirmation window.  We 
were able to implement this functionality with less than 500 LOC.  While our current 
interface is primitive, given the limited expressiveness of the cart data, we expect that 
even a more sophisticated interface would be orders of magnitude smaller than a generic 
browser. 
Security Library.  A library implementing either the SSL or TLS protocol is 
necessary to carry out secure transactions over the Internet.  In our implementation, we 
use MatrixSSL [17], an SSL library with a small footprint originally developed for 
embedded systems.  The library provides a minimal set of standard algorithms necessary 
for SSL.  At less than 10 KLOC it is significantly smaller and less complex than SSL 
library in Mozilla (NSS module in Mozilla is over 180 KLOC). 
We can see that in each case, we tradeoff functionality for a reduction in 
complexity. At one end of the spectrum is a large and complex browser that can be used 
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to accomplish multiple tasks. On the other end of the spectrum is a specialized client 
software that can perform only a single task. Selecting the appropriate tradeoff is 
dependent on technical factors such as size of code base that can be properly analyzed 
and tested and on non-technical factors such as user comfort levels. While designing 
metrics for evaluating tradeoffs is outside the scope of this thesis (Attack Surface Area 
[73] is an example of such metric), we feel that the E-commerce transaction client 
provides acceptable tradeoffs as it contains sufficient functionality for the user to carry 
out a non-trivial operation, but at the same time significantly reduces complexity. 
2.6.1.2 Constructing the AppCore 
The parser, security library and the user interface components are put together to 
form the AppCore for an E-Commerce Transaction Client. The user employs the 
AppCore to handle sensitive financial information and a legacy browser for the rest of the 
tasks. In an e-commerce transaction, the user first employs the browser to populate the 
shopping cart. When the user decides to check out, the web server contacts the E-
Commerce Transaction Client AppCore instead of the legacy browser. The user then 
provides sensitive financial information to the AppCore, which encrypts the data using 
 
Figure 2. AppCore and TCB for an E-Commerce Transaction Client. Shaded boxes 




SSL before transferring it to an untrusted network stack. We rely on authenticated 
booting and remote attestation to ensure that the user and the web server are 
communicating with the AppCore when dealing with financial information.  
We implemented the E-Commerce Transaction Client AppCore on the Nizza 
security architecture [66][68]. Nizza is composed of four major parts: a small kernel; an 
execution environment consisting of trusted components (such as a name-server and 
window manager); an untrusted legacy standard OS with its applications; and security-
sensitive applications. In our implementation, we use the L4 microkernel as the small 
kernel. The execution environment of the microkernel (called L4Env in Figure 2) 
provides essential system services such as naming, IO management and display 
management and hence has to be trusted. The browser runs as an untrusted application on 
a para-virtualized, untrusted commodity operating system (L4Linux [67]). The E-
Commerce Transaction Client AppCore is executed as trusted process, directly on top of 
the microkernel. The overall system is depicted in Figure 2. A point of interest is that the 
AppCore relies on an untrusted socket interface proxy to communicate with the external 
network. This is an example of the use of trusted wrappers: We use SSL in the AppCore 
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data before passing it over to the proxy. 
Hence we can afford to use an untrusted network stack for communication.  
2.6.1.3 Evaluation 
The Nizza architecture provides confidentiality and integrity of data at the 
operating system and middleware level. These properties are extended to the application 
layer by the E-Commerce Transaction Client AppCore. The AppCore maintains 
confidentiality and integrity of data by using a transport layer security protocol like SSL 
or IPSec to encrypt data before handing it over to untrusted components. The Nizza 
architecture also provides us with a trusted window manager that controls the top portion 
of the screen. The top of the screen, which acts as an unforgeable trust indicator, is used 
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by the window manager to indicate the trust level of the in-focus application. We assume 
that the users are a part of the TCB, i.e., they are aware of the trust indicator when they 
give out sensitive data or perform security-sensitive operations.  Since, untrusted 
applications cannot modify the trust indicator, interface spoofing attacks are minimized. 
The main focus of the AppCore approach is to reduce the size of the trusted 
computing base at the operating system, middleware and the application layers. A smaller 
and simpler code base has two advantages – a smaller code base for testing and analysis 
and a smaller attack profile. Table 2 compares the software complexity of a generic 
browser-based approach and an AppCore-based approach. The AppCore simplifies the 
functionality of the security-sensitive code in two main components: a smaller SSL 
library and a very narrow subset of HTML to describe the cart. We observe the 
simplification of components provides considerable reductions in software size. The 
entire AppCore is about one hundredth the size of the Mozilla browser.  Similar 
reductions are seen with the MCC metric. One concrete benefit of using simple Trusted 
Components is the lack of an extension architecture in the AppCore. The legacy browser 
still possesses an extension architecture, but the attacker can no longer exploit 
vulnerabilities in them to compromise sensitive information, as in [34].  
Next, we measure the time to carry out a typical e-commerce transaction using the 
AppCore. The transaction client initiates an SSL connection and receives the cart from 
Table 2. Complexity Comparison of E-Commerce Transaction Client AppCore 
and Mozilla. Level of shading indicates functional equivalence of components. 
Component LOC Cumul. MCC 
MatrixSSL         8,600         1,200 
Mozilla-NSS     180,000       24,700 
Custom Parser            200              35 
HTML-Mozilla       19,000         3,100 
AppCore       10,000         1,500 




the web-server. It displays the cart and waits for the user’s response. Depending on the 
user’s response, the client either sends the user’s payment and shipping information back 
to the server and finalizes the transaction or aborts it. Since we are interested in finding 
out the minimum time to execute the transaction, we eliminate user-interaction by 
assuming that the user always wants to accept the transaction. Table 3 lists the server-side 
execution time for a transaction over a loopback interface. Each column title represents 
the execution environment of the client and server respectively. The execution time for 
the trusted scenario (L4 - L4Linux) is around 11 % slower than the Linux scenario. But in 
absolute terms, the execution time is less than 50 ms, which is insignificant when 
compared to user response time (order of seconds).  
Finally, we discuss code and interface reuse in the AppCore. Since the AppCore 
is used only during the exchange of sensitive financial information, the user can employ 
legacy applications for other tasks, e.g., building up the shopping cart. However, we 
require the web server to use a different data format to carry out the transaction: 
specialized HTML instead of regular HTML. Hence the AppCore cannot be used with 
unmodified legacy web servers. We present a solution to this problem in the form of a 
more generalized AppCore for all https-based applications.  
2.6.2. General Applicability 
The AppCore approach is motivated by previous efforts on refactoring software 
with focus on security. Privilege Separation [90], PrivMan [76] and PrivTrans [41] are 
closest examples of the AppCore approach. All three attempt to refactor existing 
applications such that only a small portion of the code executes with high privileges. 
AppCore also has the same goal in mind; however, AppCore calls for further 
Table 3: Execution time for an E-Commerce Transaction 




Linux L4 - L4Linux 
Time (ms) 39.1 40.2 43.5 
Stdev % 0.2 10.6 8.0 
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simplification of the code executing with higher privileges providing significant 
complexity reductions. 
AppCore approach has also been successfully applied to a VPN gateway 
(MikroSINA) [69][106] and an email signer (Enigmail Plugin) [106]. In the VPN 
gateway case, the AppCore approach reduced software complexity by a factor of 3, and 
in the email signer case, it reduced the complexity by a factor of 5. In a recent work, we 
also described mechanisms for building an AppCore for POP3 mail clients [104]. The 
AppCore construction process is similar to the one for the https-based clients (Chapter 3). 
More recently, a similar approach has also been applied to device drivers, which 
typically operate in high privilege domains. MicroDrivers [62] attempts to refactor device 
drivers and splits them into a small kernel-mode component and a larger user-mode 
component that executes with lower privileges. In their study of network, SCSI and 
sound drivers, the authors noted that “critical functions”, functions that need to execute in 
kernel mode, accounted for less than 30% of the functions. In their implementation of the 
e1000 network driver, the authors achieved a 75% reduction in size of code that executes 
in kernel mode. 
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CHAPTER 3  
CLIENT-SIDE APPCORE FOR HTTPS-BASED APPLICATIONS 
 
https is a URI scheme that augments the HTTP protocol with encryption (using 
SSL or TLS) and is widely used in many applications such as online banking and 
electronic commerce. The Web-Browser (browser for short) is the most commonly used 
client-side software for https-based applications. The user, typically a human, interacts 
with a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) that consists of an operating system, a window 
manager and various libraries in addition to a web-browser. 
A typical web browser is a large and complex software that suffers from multiple 
security vulnerabilities. As shown in Section 2.6.1, we can design a simple AppCore to 
handle sensitive information. However, the solution requires the user to employ a 
functionally limited AppCore for a substantial duration. Information flow patterns in 
https-based applications provide opportunities to reduce the number of times a user has to 
interact with a functionally limited application. We first discuss information flow in 
https-based applications. Next we present challenges in protecting flow of sensitive 
information on the client side in https-based applications. We also discuss the 
opportunities afforded by https-based applications in designing a small and simple 
AppCore. We then discuss the components of a small AppCore for https-based 
application and present a prototype implementation, called BLAC, on top of the L4 
microkernel [104]. Finally, we evaluate the security properties and performance of the 
resultant AppCore. 
3.1. Information Flow in https-based applications 
Figure 3 presents the stages in an interaction between a client and a server in a 
typical https-based application. We refer to the sequence of interactions as a session. 
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Initially, the client and the server employ plain-text, HTTP-based communication. 
Therefore, information exchange is limited to non-sensitive information in this stage. 
This stage might be missing in servers that do not support the http URI. The client has to 
authenticate itself, typically using a login and a password, before it can access sensitive 
information. The authentication step is carried out using https URLs. The authentication 
information is encoded in a session identifier (the cookie), thereby enabling the user to 
access sensitive-data over multiple interactions without having to authenticate repeatedly. 
Upon successful authentication, the web server and the client exchange information over 
multiple interactions. At any point during the session, the user is allowed to logout, 
returning the interaction to unencrypted communication.  
Each stage in a session follows the HTTP protocol. The client makes an HTTP 
request based on previous HTTP responses and/or user input. The server replies with an 
HTTP response. The client parses this response to generate more requests (e.g., for 
embedded images) or render it in a viewer. The client now waits for user input to 
generate a new request.  In SSL enabled stages, requests and responses are transmitted 
over a secure channel (SSL or TLS). The client has to first establish an SSL connection 
 
Figure 3. Stages in an https-based application; collectively referred to as a 
Session. Shaded boxes indicate communication over SSL. Partially shaded boxes 




with the web server. The SSL connection could be a new connection or the restoration of 
a previously suspended connection. Next, the client transmits an HTTP request over the 
encrypted channel and receives an HTTP response. The SSL connection is then 
suspended or closed. From HTTP/1.0 onwards, more than one HTTP request and 
response can be exchanged before an SSL connection is closed or suspended. 
Information flow in https-based applications can be classified into three 
categories: Non-sensitive, Low-sensitivity and High-sensitivity information. Of the three, 
the first one is accessed using http URIs and the later two are available only through https 
URIs. This three level classification has justifications in the realm of many online 
applications such as online banking and electronic commerce. In electronic commerce, 
the user is asked to choose shipping address, select a payment method, enter a new 
payment method (e.g., bank account or credit card information) and confirm the 
purchase. Clearly, information on a new payment method is more sensitive than shipping 
address. Since confirming a purchase modifies account status and places a financial 
burden on the user, we also treat user’s choice on confirmation as high-sensitivity data. 
We argue that the user and the service provider want to use a more trustworthy software 
stack to handle such high-sensitivity information. 
3.2. Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Information Flow 
There are two key challenges to protecting information flow on the client-side in 
https-based applications. First, current client-side software are large and complex, 
hindering analysis and testing. This results in Trusted Components with multiple critical 
security vulnerabilities. We already discussed the software complexity and vulnerability 
issues of browsers, a commonly used client-side application-level software for https-
based applications, in Section 2.6.1.  
The second challenge is the popularity and ubiquity of current software and 
interfaces. For example, web browsers are increasingly used in many online applications 
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including mail, spreadsheet and document editing. Users are very familiar with the user-
interface (UI) and the functionality provided by the browser. Limiting the functionality or 
modifying the UI will reduce the appeal of the modified software. Similarly interfaces at 
various levels of the software stack are too widely used to modified or abandoned 
outright, e.g., API between OS kernels and application-level software can be enhanced 
with information flow primitives [70], but this approach will not be applicable to the 
large number of existing software. Information exchange protocols between service 
provider and client, e.g., HTTP protocol, too are well entrenched that solution requiring 
modifications to the protocol will have limited appeal. 
Previous efforts have addressed the first challenge, large and complex software 
stacks, by proposing application-specific TCBs (e.g., Terra [64]). While this reduces the 
size and complexity of the TCB, it does not address complexity of middleware and 
application-level software. A simple version of AppCore for e-commerce transactions 
(Section 2.6.1 and [106]) extends this approach to all layers of the software stack by 
reducing complexity of Trusted Components of application-level software. However, 
reducing the complexity of Trusted Components requires modifications such as curtailing 
the functionality of the components and narrowing the interface exported by the 
components. Moreover, the E-Commerce Transaction Client AppCore required the use of 
the functionally-constrained AppCore for all https interactions. As opposed to 
transmitting financial information in e-commerce transactions, other https-based 
applications such as online banking can consist of a large number of user interactions, 
e.g., browsing accounts, looking at various reports and graphs, etc. In such a scenario, 
using functionally limited software for extended periods of time significantly 
inconveniences the user. 
The Proxos approach [109] attempts to work around this problem by allowing 
software developers to specify trust in one of the interfaces – the OS-application (system 
call) interface – by splitting the interface into a trusted and untrusted part. The trusted 
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part of the interface is implemented by a trusted OS, whereas the untrusted part is 
implemented by a commodity operating system. By doing so, Proxos allows the reuse of 
current application-level software and systems software as far as possible, while at the 
same time minimizing modifications to the application-level software. However, large 
and complex client software such as browsers and middleware such as the display 
manager still need to be completely trusted. 
Opportunities: Client-server also applications possess many properties that allow 
us to reduce complexity and reuse existing software and interfaces as far as possible. 
First, information flow in a session of interaction in client-server application contains 
data items with differing security and functionality requirements. As a concrete example, 
consider a session in an online banking application, where the user logs in, checks her 
account, modifies her account and logs off. One can argue that account status information 
is less sensitive than user authorization for account modifications, e.g., transfer of funds, 
ordering cheques or change of personal information. Some banks already recognize this 
difference in sensitiveness of information and ask the user for an authorization token, 
e.g., a one-time Transaction Authorization Number (TAN), for account modifications to 
be approved [8]. From a functionality point of view, account status information also 
requires a richer presentation format, e.g., spreadsheets and graphs, whereas account 
modification information typically shows up in a tabular format on a confirm page. 
Sensitive input consists of human input in the form of a sequence of keystrokes or mouse 
clicks.  
We can leverage this difference in security and functionality requirements and 
construct small and simple components to handle security-sensitive information and 
handling the rest of the information in legacy components. Doing so allows us to reuse 
existing interfaces as far as possible.  
Another opportunity arises from the functionality and security tradeoffs preferred 
by the user and the service provider. For example, the user might be willing to use legacy 
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components on her computer system to handle sensitive information, but prefers to use 
small and simple components to operate on all sensitive information when working on a 
public-access machine. Similarly, during a virus outbreak, the service provider might ask 
users to interact using smaller and simple components more extensively than otherwise. 
By providing the user (and the service provider, if necessary) with freedom in choosing 
the components, we can ensure that security requirements are balanced with the 
functionality requirements. 
3.3. Components of AppCore 
Previously, we noted that all data items exchanged using https do not have the 
same security requirements (Section 3.1). We leverage this difference in sensitiveness of 
data items to select between fully-functional, but complex legacy application-level 
software and small and simple but functionally constrained software. We allow users (or 
web servers) to determine the usage of the small and simple application-level software 
(called the Trusted Viewer) based on their security and functionality tradeoffs.  
We use a novel approach to split the information flow between the two types of 
application level software. We use an https proxy, which has to be trusted, to determine 
the sensitiveness of incoming messages from the web server. Sensitiveness is determined 
by user-provided or web-server-provided patterns. Any HTTP response that contains any 
of these patterns is passed on to the Trusted Viewer and the rest of the messages are 
passed on to the legacy browser. We achieve this separation with minimal modifications 
to the legacy browser: we modify the https proxy settings of the browser. We also do not 
require any modifications to the HTTP protocol and therefore, we can interoperate with 
the large number of legacy clients and web servers. In the rest of this section, we describe 
the two components of the AppCore: the https proxy and the Trusted Viewer. 
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3.3.1. The https Proxy  
The https proxy has three functions: multiplex and demultiplex requests and 
responses amongst the Trusted Viewer and the legacy browser, identify high-sensitivity 
information in http responses, and finally, accept configuration information from the 
TrustedViewer. Since we require our solution to work with legacy service providers, we 
cannot assume that incoming information will be tagged with sensitivity levels. 
Therefore, we have to infer sensitiveness of information based on HTTP requests or 
responses.  
3.3.1.1 Inferring Sensitive Information in https  
There are two sources of high-sensitivity information in https-based applications: 
the service provider and the user. Since the https proxy lies in between the service 
provider and the client-side application-level software, it can trap any high-sensitivity 
information originating from the service provider. However, the proxy cannot directly 
trap or control any high-sensitivity input originating from user. However, the proxy can 
be programmed to redirect all HTTP responses that request the user to enter high-
sensitivity data to the TrustedViewer. To do so, we have to expand the notion of high-
sensitivity responses to include even non-sensitive or low-sensitivity responses that lead 
to high-sensitivity user input.  
It is easy for users and service providers to identify high-sensitivity information at 
the data item level, e.g., password, payment information or a TAN. However, the values 
for these sensitive data items varies considerably and we cannot expect the proxy to be 
able to parse every response to determine if a variable sequence of characters or numbers 
is high-sensitivity data or not. Ideally, we would like to look for static and unique content 
in HTTP responses to identify responses containing high-sensitivity data. We assume that 
the user or the service provider has identified possibly unique text patterns in HTTP 
responses that contain high-sensitivity data.  
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We employ a two stage filtering process on the client-side to accurately identify 
high-sensitivity responses: first, we use simple pattern matching in the https proxy to trap 
all HTTP responses that contain the text pattern. While this leads to false positives, i.e., a 
low-sensitivity response is treated as a high-sensitivity response, it is conservative 
because with proper keywords, we identify all high-sensitivity responses. Next, we 
employ more complex parsing based on expected HTML page structure in the 
TrustedViewer (Section 3.3.2) to identify the high-sensitivity responses among the 
trapped responses and redirect all false positives back to the untrusted software stack.  
Note that in the worst case, if the user or the service provider does not provide 
any keywords, all responses will have to be trapped and parsed. If the parsing fails, the 
response is redirected to the legacy browser. While this will increase the response time 
for the user, it will prevent the flow of high-sensitivity information to legacy or untrusted 
computing bases.  
As an example, while shopping on Amazon.com, user’s choice on the 
confirmation page is high-sensitivity data. This high-sensitivity data is encoded in an 
HTTP request, which originates from the HTTP response that contains the confirm page. 
The confirm page contains the string `alt=”Place Your Order”`.  So we trap all 
responses that contain the above string. In the unlikely case that someone has a product 
with the same title, that particular product page will also be trapped. However, the 
confirm-page parser that resides in the TrustedViewer will fail to parse the product page 
and it will be redirected back to the legacy browser. 
3.3.1.2 Demultiplexing HTTP Responses 
Once high-sensitive HTTP responses have been identified, the https proxy must 
direct them to the TrustedViewer. To do so, the proxy must also transfer client-side state 
from the legacy client software to the TrustedViewer. This is easy in the case of https-
based applications as client-side state is embedded in a cookie. Since the cookie is 
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transmitted with every outgoing message, the proxy has to capture the outgoing message 
and transfer it to the TrustedViewer along with the high-sensitivity response.  
Switching from the TrustedViewer to the legacy client software is easier because 
the TrustedViewer does not modify client-side state. Since the old cookie is still valid, the 
https proxy does not have to take any additional steps to maintain client-state coherency 
between the two software stacks. 
3.3.1.3 Accepting Configurations from the TrustedViewer 
The third task of the https proxy is to accept configuration information from the 
TrustedViewer. To do so, the https proxy exports a control interface that accepts 
configuration information from the TrustedViewer. As seen in Section 3.3.1.1, text 
patterns are the only configuration information needed by the https proxy. 
3.3.2. Trusted Viewer 
The TrustedViewer consists of three parts: a configuration file, a DOM tree 
builder that can be used to extract parser and a GUI to interact with users. The 
configuration file lists all text patterns that are associated with high-sensitivity 
information and will trigger the activation of the TrustedViewer. The configuration file 
varies for each service provider. At startup, the TrustedViewer registers these patterns 
with the https proxy. Upon receiving a HTTP response which contains any of the 
keywords, the https proxy forwards the HTTP response and the corresponding HTTP 
request to the TrustedViewer. Remember that the HTTP request contains the cookie that 
is necessary for all subsequent interactions. 
The second part of the TrustedViewer is a simple parser. The parser contains two 
sets of configuration information: (a) XPaths [32] in the response HTML document 
pointing to data that must be extracted and (b) sanity check tuples. A sanity check tuple is 
of the form <XPath, SanityPattern>. This indicates that the parser must check for the 
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occurrence of the SanityPattern in the given XPath. For example, the confirm page for 
electronic commerce transactions typically contains standard patterns such as “Shipping 
Information”, “Order Total” in predetermined XPaths.  
The parser builds a DOM tree of the HTML document and extracts content from 
all specified XPaths. At the same time, the parser also checks if the SanityPatterns 
specified in the sanity check tuple match the extracted content. On success, the parser 
returns information in a tabular format to the TrustedViewer. If either the extraction fails 
or SanityPattern matching fails, the parser sends an error message to the GUI component. 
For more robust parsing, HTML content extraction tools as described in [79] can be 
employed. If the page cannot be parsed by the TrustedViewer, the user is given an 
opportunity to cancel the interaction or forward the page to the legacy software stack. 
The third part of the TrustedViewer is a GUI component that displays the high-
sensitivity information extracted by the parser. The GUI allows users to enter text input 
and confirm or cancel an interaction. The GUI also contains an option to forward the 
page to the browser, if the user feels that the page was not properly parsed or if the user 
feels that the tradeoff between functionality and security has changed. 
Adding a new page to the TrustedViewer is easily accomplished. We have 
developed a script that operates on templates of HTML files that have to be handled by 
the TrustedViewer. The user clicks on content that she deems sensitive and the script 
provides the XPath of the content. At this point, the user can also select text patterns to 
generate sanity check tuples. The user then provides the XPath values along with the text 
patterns for the page to the TrustedViewer. The TrustedViewer forwards the text patterns 
to the https parser and uses the XPath and sanity check tuple to parse the new page. 
3.4. Implementation 
We implemented the two components of the AppCore on top of Nizza 
architecture. The resultant system, called BLAC, described in Figure 4. Once again, we 
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rely on the L4 microkernel and its execution environment, L4Env, to provide the 
necessary functionality. The https proxy and the Trusted Viewer are executed as separate 
processes directly on top of the microkernel. The legacy browser is executed as an 
untrusted process on top of a paravirtualized, legacy operating system (L4Linux). We 
modified the browser settings, requiring it to communicate with our https proxy to access 
https URIs. 
The https proxy accepts text patterns from the Trusted Viewer to determine the 
sensitiveness of responses from the web server. In the case of a match, the https proxy 
directs the response to the Trusted Viewer. All other responses are directed to the 
browser. In addition the https proxy is also capable of redirecting erroneously classified 
responses from the Trusted Viewer to the browser.  
 
Figure 4. Architecture of the BLAC system. High sensitivity information, as 
identified by the text patterns, is directed to a small trusted viewer and the rest of the 




3.5.1. Security Properties of BLAC 
BLAC improves the security properties of client-side software stack in three 
ways: First, BLAC switches software stacks depending on the sensitiveness of 
information being handled. In current systems, the same software stack is used to handle 
different categories of information flows. Therefore, an attacker can exploit 
vulnerabilities in handling of non-sensitive information to either access sensitive 
information (e.g., cross-site scripting attacks [42][92]) or to compromise the software 
stack (e.g., exploit arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities in browsers to install 
malicious extensions [34]). Since BLAC separates the handling of different categories of 
information flow, these attacks will no longer succeed in compromising the flow of 
sensitive information. 
Secondly, BLAC treats the browser and its execution environment (L4Linux and 
X server) as untrusted components. By preventing the flow of sensitive information to 
these components, BLAC ensures that vulnerabilities in these components cannot affect 
the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information. However, the current BLAC 
architecture and implementation does not address availability issues. This leaves open the 
possibility of Denial of Service attacks, e.g., by crashing the network stack, the attacker 
can prevent the https proxy from communicating with the service provider. We are 
exploring the use of replication to improve availability properties of BLAC.  
Thirdly, BLAC uses a small and simple application and software stack to handle 
high-sensitivity information. We compare the size and complexity of BLAC with a 
comparable Linux-based software stack. The Linux-based software stack is configured to 
provide the same functionality as provided by BLAC. Table 4 compares the software 
complexity metrics of the two approaches. At the application layer, we can see that the 
size and complexity of BLAC is two orders of magnitude smaller than that of the 
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browser. Comparing the complexity of the full system, we see that BLAC is an order of 
magnitude smaller than a comparable Linux-based system. 
This comparison might seem unfair, especially given that the Mozilla Firefox 
browser possesses much more functionality than the TrustedViewer. However, one 
should note that BLAC employs the TrustedViewer to operate on high-sensitivity data. 
The browser, with its varied functionality, is still available to the user to operate on low-
sensitivity or non-sensitive data. 
3.5.2. Performance 
Since the https proxy introduces a layer of indirection between the user and the 
service provider, we expect performance degradation. This section attempts to quantify 
the overheads introduced by the https proxy. We used two identical machines, each with 
a 2.26 GHz, Pentium-4 processor and 512 MB of RAM. The machines were connected 
using a 100 Mbps switch. The standard deviation was less than 5% in most experiments 
and less than 10% in all our experiments. We used https traces from four online sites in 
our experiments: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Chase Bank and Amazon.com. Table 5 
presents a profile of the four data sets. Pages represent the number of complete pages that 
were in the trace. Each page is the result of a user-initiated HTTPS request. Since a page 
Table 4: Complexity Comparison of BLAC and a Linux-based software stack. 
The Linux kernel includes networking, file system, IO, memory management 
support. L4Env includes servers for bootstrapping the system and resource managers 





  MCC Composition LOC
a
 MCC 
OS L4 14,000 2,300 Linux Kernel 383,000 65,000 
Middleware L4Env 86,300 11,300 X Server 1,015,000 140,300 




5,000        290 Mozilla 
Firefox 
978,000 151,000 
Total  118,900  15,790  2,376,000 345,300 
a We used SLOCCount [113] to measure lines of code. 
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consists of many fragments, each of which has to be requested separately by the client 
application, we also list the number of fragments in the trace and the maximum number 
of fragments per page. In all traces, the login request resulted in the maximum number of 
fragments requested. 
In our experiments, the server side consists of a simple program that reads the 
traces, accepts HTTP requests over an SSL channel and transmits the appropriate HTTP 
response over the same SSL channel. We used three client-side configurations. One is a 
Linux client that connects to the server using SSL and generates HTTP requests. The 
client reads the complete response and discards it. The second configuration represents a 
legacy software stack configuration in BLAC. We use the same client as before; 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of File Access Times. 
Table 5. Dataset for Measuring Page Access Times. Traces were generated using 
the WebScarab proxy [16] and the Internet Explorer web browser. Caching was 
enabled in the browser and the cache was cleaned before generating the trace. 
Dataset Pages Fragments Size (KB) Max. Frags/Page 
Amazon 6 52 569 40 
Deutsche Bank 14 67 441 20 
Dresdner Bank 18 107 931 17 




however, it runs on L4Linux and connects to the https proxy. For this configuration, we 
also measured the performance of the proxy, when it contacts the service provider. This 
allows us to identify the overheads introduced by the proxy. The third client 
configuration consists of a TrustedViewer using IPC to contact the https proxy and 
request files from the service provider. 
First, we measure the retrieval times for individual files. Figure 5 compares the 
performance of the various client configurations. Accessing a page in the L4Linux client 
through the https proxy is about 2 to 2.5 times slower than the original Linux 
implementation. Regression analysis of data showed that overhead is represented by the 
equation  
ovhd = 0.535 * file_size + 17.9; and r2 = 0.998. 
where ovhd is the overhead in milliseconds and file_size is the size of the 
retrieved file in kilobytes. In absolute terms, the overhead per file is of the order of few 
tens of milliseconds. 
Since an HTML page is typically composed of multiple fragments, we also 
measure “page” access times for the dataset mentioned in Table 1. Figure 6 plots the CDF 
 
Figure 6. CDF of HTML Page Access Time based on HTML pages from our 
traces. As expected, pages with fewer fragments (not shown on graph) had lower 
page retrieval times. 
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of page access times for the Linux and the L4Linux client. While the L4Linux client is 
slower than the Linux client, we see that the page retrieval time is less than 0.5 seconds in 
90% of the cases. The pathological cases occur when a page has a large number of 
fragments, as illustrated in the figure. Even in the worst case, the page retrieval time is 
around 2.25 seconds. A survey by Jupiter Research and Akamai showed that about 75% 
of shoppers are willing to wait up to four seconds for a page to load [12]. So, even in the 
worst case, we are within the threshold for a majority of users. 
We would like to note that the performance of our proxy can be improved in 
many ways. One source of improvement is to implement the HTTP/1.1 protocol in the 
https proxy that allows multiple requests to be sent over a single SSL connection. This 
amortizes the overhead of the CONNECT message and SSL connection establishment 
phase (14.5 ms in our current implementation). Techniques such as VMM-bypass-IO [82] 
can also be employed to reduce the overhead performing IO in virtual machine based 
systems.   
3.5.3. Complications with Real-World Web Servers 
Once again, we studied the four web sites mentioned in Table 2. High-sensitivity 
interactions accounted for two pages in all bank sites: login and confirm page. In 
Amazon.com, three pages were deemed highly sensitive: login page, confirm page and 
payment page as the user could enter a new payment method in the payment page. The 
payment page is a good example of a page where the user might want to transfer a page 
from the TrustedViewer to the legacy browser, in the case that she is not entering any 
high-sensitivity information. Compared to the total number of pages in the session, we 
can see that the TrustedViewer is sparingly used. We successfully tested our complete 
prototype using Deutsche Bank’s demonstration account [8]. 
In our analysis of these sites, we came across some cases which cannot be 
handled by our current implementation. First, if the browser chooses to enable 
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compression, then we are not able to handle HTTP requests and responses. This problem 
can be solved by adding a compression library to the https proxy or by rejecting 
compressed requests from the browser. 
The second problem is more critical as there are some web service provides who 
present the login page over an http URL. The login request is still transferred using the 
https URL. Since our proxy is an https proxy, we cannot currently capture such pages. 
Once again there are two solutions: one is to use the https URL instead of the http URL 
while retrieving the login page. This is not a problem as most sites allow http URL 
content to be served over https URLs. Alternatively, we could add an http proxy to the 
https proxy. While this will lead to increased overheads, we will be able to capture all 
requests for high-sensitivity data.  
Another problem faced by the current version of BLAC is that SSL and HTTP do 
not provide support for remote attestation. This opens up the possibility of a malicious, 
untrusted browser generating an HTTP request that mimics a request generated by the 
TrustedViewer. For example, in electronic commerce sites such as Amazon.com, the 
user’s choice on Confim/Cancel is high-sensitivity data and this data is encoded in the 
HTTP request. As there is no secret information involved in generating the request such 
as a TAN, the browser too can generate similar HTTP requests and modify the state of 
the user’s account. We expect this problem to be alleviated with the use of remote 
attestation. 
3.5.4. Revisiting Design Goals 
In Section 2.2.1, we mentioned five design goals of an effective solution. Of the 
five goals, we evaluated security properties, complexity reductions and performance 
overheads in the previous subsections. This section evaluates the design and 
implementation of BLAC with respect to the other two requirements.  
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Reuse of Legacy Software. BLAC reuses unmodified (excluding proxy settings), 
legacy software to handle non-sensitive and low-sensitivity information flows. Hence 
users can employ legacy client application-level software for all non-sensitive and low-
sensitivity interactions. We also saw that in online banking and e-commerce sites, the 
user has to interact sparingly with the Trusted Viewer. 
Reuse of Interfaces. The HTTP protocol and data formats of each message (text, 
images, video, etc...) form the functional and data interface in https-based applications. 
The https proxy in BLAC does not require any modifications to either SSL or the HTTP 
protocol. Similarly, the https proxy infers sensitiveness from existing responses and does 
not require any modifications to the data format. Hence, BLAC interoperates smoothly 
with legacy clients and service providers. 
3.6. Discussion 
3.6.1. Applicability to other VMM-based approaches 
While we implemented BLAC on a microkernel platform, it can also be 
implemented on other platforms, including commodity operating systems. In any 
platform, the first requirement is that the https proxy, the Trusted Viewer and the legacy 
browser need to be executed in different protection domains to isolate the flow of 
sensitive information. Second, the platform must support communication primitives so 
that the https proxy can exchange data with the Trusted Viewer and the legacy browser. 
Environments such as Xen [35], Asbestos [54], Linux and Microsoft Windows 
satisfy both above requirements. A Xen-based implementation, for example, would have 
each of the above mentioned components executing in a separate VM. They can 
communicate with each other using network stacks. In a Linux-based implementation, the 
components can execute as different users and they communicate using the network stack 
or more efficient IPC such as shared memory. 
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3.6.2. Server-Side Support 
One of the key requirements for AppCores (and BLAC) was support for legacy 
service providers. This complicates our design and implementation of BLAC, e.g., we 
have to indirectly infer the sensitiveness of information in the responses. With server-side 
support, we can further simplify the Trusted Components (https proxy and the Trusted 
Viewer) in BLAC. 
First, the service provider could label information in its responses with sensitivity 
levels. In HTTP responses, this means adding an additional field to the response header: 
Sensitivity= [Non | Low | High]. This step would reduce the need for parsing of responses 
in the https proxy. However, to support user driven configurability, we would still have to 
rely on indirect methods for inferring sensitiveness of responses.  
Secondly, if the service provider tags some responses as High-sensitivity, then the 
service provider could use a simple representation format (e.g., tabular format for high-
sensitivity pages in BLAC) or provide template files for extracting relevant data from the 




CHAPTER 4  
A SERVER-SIDE APPCORE FOR WEB SERVICE PLATFORMS 
 
Service-Oriented Computing (more recently also referred to as “service 
computing”) is designed to support rapid creation of new, value-added applications and 
business processes that can span diverse organizations and computing platforms. 
Concretely, Paypal’s Web Services, eBay Developer Program and Amazon Web Services 
are illustrative examples of web services being used in mission-critical, security-
sensitive, and truly large scale applications.  Despite the widespread deployment of web 
services, however, significant research challenges remain.  This dissertation is concerned 
with the protection of security-sensitive information in service computing. 
Web Service Platforms (WSPs) such as Apache Axis2, Microsoft .NET and IBM 
WebSphere provide essential functionality such as SOAP messaging and support for 
publishing and discovering web services. Additionally, WSPs provide desirable 
functionality such as support for web service composition, atomicity and message 
reliability. Support for such large and varied functionality has increased the size and 
complexity of current WSPs; for example, the open source Axis2 WSP and its extensions 
account for over 110,000 lines of code (LOC).  
However, as we demonstrate later (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), the design and 
implementation of current WSPs requires users and service providers to trust large and 
complex components. The configurability and extensibility of many WSPs poses 
additional challenges to testing and analysis. This has resulted in WSPs with multiple 
security vulnerabilities [18][20]. We apply the AppCore approach to WSPs to split 
existing WSPs into two parts: a small, trusted T-WSP that handles security-sensitive 
information and a legacy, untrusted U-WSP that handles non-sensitive and protected 
(encrypted or signed) sensitive information (Section 4.3). We call the resulting 
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architecture ISO-WSP [107]. However, since WSPs interact with application-level code, 
we also have to modify application-level code. We introduce the notion of a Secure 
Function Interface (SFI) to split existing applications into trusted and untrusted parts, 
thereby allowing existing applications to be ported to ISO-WSP with minimal 
modifications (Section 4.5). 
4.1. Design of Web Service Platforms 
W3C’s web services architecture specification [30] specifies the basic framework 
for WSPs. WSPs such as Apache Axis2 and Microsoft .NET implement this framework. 
The framework consists of three entities: a service provider, a client and a web service 
discovery agency. A WSP is used to mediate interactions between the three entities and 
this requires support for three basic classes of functionality: exchanging messages, 
describing web services and publishing and discovering web service descriptions. Since 
this dissertation addresses the security of information exchanges between the service 
provider and the client, we focus on the first class of functionality: support for message 
exchanges.  
Figure 7 presents one view of the web services stack, as illustrated in W3C’s 
specification [31]. All WSPs must implement a transport protocol, typically HTTP, and 
provide support for a message packaging mechanism, typically SOAP. The WSPs might 
also choose to support additional message packaging and transport mechanisms such as 
MIME over SMTP. In addition to the basic features, the WSP must also support 
functionality such as routing, transaction support, message reliability, security and quality 
of service. W3C has also standardized many types of additional functionality in the form 
of WS-* extensions such as WS-Addressing, WS-Security amongst others. Table 6 lists 
some of the WS-* extensions and briefly describes the functionality of each type of 
extension. WSPs may also possess an extension architecture to seamlessly integrate new 
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and upcoming WS-* specifications or to provide support for custom extensions for 
logging or load-balancing. 
The Apache Axis2 WSP [89] is one implementation of the web services 
framework. We use the Axis2 WSP in our analysis as not only is it widely used, it is also 
available under an open source license, enabling us to gain a clearer understanding of its 
workings. Axis2 provides support for developing, deploying, managing and invoking 
web services. Additionally, Axis2 also provides support for utilizing many WS-* 
extensions such as WS-Security and WS-ReliableMessaging. As we are primarily 
interested in the processing of web service requests and responses, we focus on the SOAP 
processing model of Axis2 [3]. Figure 8 illustrates the SOAP processing chain for a web 
service request or response in the Axis2 WSP. Axis2 handles all message interactions 
using two basic message handling sequences: In Pipe and Out Pipe for incoming and 
outgoing messages respectively. As the basic structure of both sequences is similar, we 
use the In Pipe as an illustrative example. 
An incoming web service request is first received by the Transport Listener. The 
Transport Listener creates a message context and starts the In Pipe, which consists of a 
series of handlers. First, the transport handlers are used to verify transport protocol 
headers and populate the message context with data from the message. Next, handlers are 
 
Figure 7. Web Services Stack. From 
W3C's Web Services Architecture 
specification [9]. 
 






used to process addressing headers and determine the target service. After this, user 
specified handlers are executed to perform tasks such as security processing, transaction 
support or reliable messaging support. Finally, the message is deserialized into language 
level objects and given to the web service implementation, which executes the business 
logic. 
Axis2 uses handlers to implement and support various types of optional 
functionalities. For example, handlers are used to support many of the WS-* extensions 
like WS-Security and WS-Addressing. Additionally, Axis2 allows for custom handlers to 
perform web service-specific, non-standard tasks such as admission control, load 
balancing or logging. 
4.2. Security Problems in Web Service Platforms 
The WS-Security specification [15] was designed to protect the confidentiality 
and integrity of information flow in web services. However, WS-Security-based 
protection can be bypassed by exploiting vulnerabilities in endpoint software. On the 
server side, attackers can compromise information flow by exploiting vulnerabilities in 
server software: operating system, web server, WSPs [18][20], or the business logic and 
Table 6. List of some WS-* extensions and the functionality provided by each 
of them [13] 
Extensions Functionality 
WS-Addressing Provides a uniform naming scheme to address end-
points. 
WS-Security, WS-Trust,  
WS-SecureConversation, ... 




Transaction Support for web services. 
WS-ReliableMessaging Support for reliable delivery of messages over non-
reliable communication channels. 
WSDL, WS-Policy, ... Support for description and exchange of metadata 
between clients and service providers. 




its support software (e.g., database software). Similarly, on the client side, attackers can 
leverage vulnerabilities in client-side WSPs or client applications like the browser. In this 
section, we focus on securing WSPs. Securing client applications was discussed 
previously (Chapter 3). 
From a security perspective, WSP implementations have two significant issues. 
First, at the component level, WSPs violate the principle of least privilege (PoLP). PoLP 
states that components should execute with the least set of privileges necessary to finish 
the job. WSPs contain many components that do not need access to sensitive data, e.g., 
WS-* extensions such as WS-Addressing. However, all these components execute in the 
same address space and same protection domain. Hence they can either directly access 
security-sensitive data or modify WS-Security processing by modifying security 
processing parameters and compromise security-sensitive data. 
Concretely, in the Axis2 WSP, all handlers execute in the same protection domain 
as the rest of the WSP and the application-level code. Therefore, handlers that do not 
require access to sensitive data get access directly (reading message contents) or 
indirectly. Figure 9 provides an example of indirect access in the Axis2 WSP, where a 
misbehaving handler, even one that operates on encrypted data can compromise 
information flow by changing WS-Security processing parameters. 
 
  // All Handlers can retrieve the message, service context 
  param = ctx0.getAxisConfiguration().getParameter("OutflowSecurity"); 
  if (param !=null){ 
    ome = param.getParameterElement(); 
    itor = ome.getFirstElement().getChildElements(); 
    while (itor.hasNext()){ 
      attr = (OMElement) itor.next(); 
      // Look for Encryption Key and Set it to a weak key? 
      if ("encryptionUser".equals(attr.getLocalName())){ 
        attr.setText("weak_key_identifier"); 
      } 
  } 
Figure 9. Indirect Access in the Axis2 WSP. All handlers have access to service 
context, which contains, amongst others, parameters for the encryption key. A malicious 




Secondly, a WSP is a complex piece of software. As seen earlier (Section 4.1), 
WSPs are expected to perform a large number of tasks. Unsurprisingly, they contain large 
code bases. Additionally, since WSPs have to be configurable and extensible, they also 
typically possess configuration files, an extension-architecture and multiple extensions. 
Concretely, the Axis2 WSP alone contains about 23.5 KLOC. Together with the 
implementations of the multiple WS-* specifications, the WSP contains over 110 KLOC. 
Additionally, programmers can write custom handlers to carry out other types of 
processing like load balancing or admission control. These components add to the 
complexity of the system. Given the large code base and the multitude of ways in which 
these components can interact with each other, it is not practical to test the components of 
the WSP, especially as a complete system, and eliminate all vulnerabilities. Moreover, 
the configurable nature of WSPs means that extensions can be added, enabled and 
disabled at runtime, further complicating the analysis and testing of WSPs. 
4.3. Components of the AppCore 
First, we identify and extract components from the legacy WSP that require 
access to sensitive information (i.e., trusted components). Second, we have to design a 
new trusted component, called the Message Splicer to control the flow of sensitive 
information. These components are composed together to form the AppCore, called the 
T-WSP (Trusted WSP). The rest of the legacy WSP does not have to be trusted and is 
called the U-WSP (Untrusted WSP). 
4.3.1. Components taken from Legacy WSP  
In our analysis of legacy WSP components, we assume that all security-sensitive 
information is protected using WS-Security [15]. While the SSL and TLS protocols can 
be used to protect information, they are not always suited for web services because of the 
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unique needs of web services, e.g., support for fine-grained encryption or signatures such 
as signing SOAP headers. Hence, we do not consider them in our analysis. 
Identifying the components of the T-WSP requires understanding of the various 
components of the WSP and their corresponding functions. We relied on W3C’s 
architecture specification [30], specifications for the WS-* extensions such as WS-
ReliableMessaging, WS-Addressing [13], and the Axis2 web services middleware 
architecture guide [3]. Based on our analysis, we found that the security-related 
extensions such as WS-Security, WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation are the 
components of the WSP that have to be trusted. These components have to be trusted for 
one of two reasons:  
• They require access to sensitive contents of a message (Direct Access). 
WS-Security implementations fall under this category as they need access to sensitive 
contents either to protect them (encrypt or sign) or to verify the protection on them 
(decrypt or verify signatures). 
• Or, they control behavior of components with direct access (Indirect 
Access). This includes other security specifications such as WS-Trust and WS-
SecureConversation. The implementation of these specifications have to be trusted, even 
though they do not require access to sensitive data, as these components control WS-
Security processing. A malicious implementation can subvert WS-Security processing, 
e.g., employ a weak encryption key, to gain access to or leak sensitive information. 
The rest of the components of the WSP, including the WS-* extensions, are 
agnostic to message contents and can be treated as untrusted components. For example, 
the transport layer protocol implementation or SOAP implementation is agnostic to 
message contents as long as the contents confirm to the SOAP message format. However, 
there is a special class of untrusted components that requires access to sensitive data such 
as signature or encryption keys, albeit indirectly. WS-* extensions such as WS-
Addressing recommend the use of WS-Security to protect the integrity and in some cases, 
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the confidentiality of SOAP message headers. These extensions require the use of WS-
Security and associated signature or encryption keys. Even though they are indirectly 
dependent on sensitive data, they do not require access to sensitive data, especially the 
contents of the message body. While these extensions are crucial to maintain the 
reliability and availability properties of web services, they do not affect the 
confidentiality and integrity of end-user data. Therefore, we do not treat them as Trusted 
Components. 
4.3.2. Message Splicer 
Isolating security-relevant processing in the T-WSP does not prevent the flow of 
sensitive information to the U-WSP. We need a completely new component, analogous to 
the https proxy in the AppCore for https-based applications, to control the flow of 
sensitive information. We call this component the Message Splicer1. The function of the 
Message Splicer is to replace sensitive data with dummy, non-sensitive data or vice 
versa. For an incoming message, the Message Splicer replaces sensitive data items with 
dummy data items and a token that uniquely identifies an instance of a sensitive data item 
and transfers the message to the U-WSP. The token acts as a capability for the sensitive 
data item. The Message Splicer passes the sensitive information directly to the trusted 
part of the application. For an outgoing message, the Message Splicer accepts sensitive 
data from the trusted part of the application and non-sensitive data from the U-WSP, 
composes them in a single message, and passes it on for security processing. Sensitive 
data items are protected (encrypted or signed) before being transferred to the untrusted 
WSP for further processing and transmission. Section 4.7.1.1 discusses the utility of 
having a Message Splicer. 
4.4. Architecture of ISO-WSP 
                                                 
1 Message Splicer is derived from Gene Splicing. Gene splicing is the process of creating recombinant 
DNA by cutting and joining DNA sequences from multiple DNA fragments. 
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We call the combination of the T-WSP and the U-WSP as ISO-WSP. Figure 10 
provides an overview of the architecture of ISO-WSP. As explained in the previous 
subsection, implementation of security specifications form the T-WSP, and the rest of the 
components form the U-WSP. In each case, the components are grouped together and 
executed as independent applications. In addition to the separation of components of the 
WSP, the configuration files and the application-level code too have to be classified and 
separated into two categories. Since the behavior of the security specifications can be 
controlled by configuration files, the corresponding configuration files also have to be 
trusted and secured from access by untrusted components. 
We enforce separation between the T-WSP and the U-WSP by executing them in 
separate protection domains, with the U-WSP running with lower privileges. This 
prevents U-WSP from modifying the binaries or configuration files of the T-WSP. This 
separation also prevents U-WSP from accessing the secret keys used for encryption or 
decryption. The Message Splicer, discussed in Section 4.3.2, prevents the flow of 
sensitive information to the U-WSP or to the untrusted parts of the application. Section 
4.5 discusses our approach of protecting the flow of sensitive information in the 
application-level code in detail. 
 
Figure 10. Architecture of ISO-WSP. Shaded boxes represent Trusted 
Components. Trusted Components execute in a separate protection domain. 
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A legacy WSP can be converted to an ISO-WSP with a small number of 
modifications. After constructing a T-WSP, we have to modify the legacy WSP to invoke 
the T-WSP via remote invocation mechanisms instead of using local calls. This involves 
identifying parameters that are exchanged between the T-WSP and U-WSP, message and 
results of security processing, and adding the necessary serializing and deserializing code. 
One of the main features of the ISO-WSP is that ISO-WSP exports the same 
external interface as legacy WSPs, thereby allowing ISO-WSPs to work with legacy 
clients. The U-WSP provides support for the interface by implementing transport-layer 
protocols such as HTTP over TCP/IP. 
Another key feature of ISO-WSP is that the U-WSP can still execute WS-Security 
libraries in its protection domain. However, to reiterate, the U-WSP cannot access the 
secret keys of the T-WSP. Therefore, any data encrypted with these keys is inaccessible 
to the U-WSP. The U-WSP can use this feature along with weaker keys or keys with 
weaker security guarantees to provide limited security guarantees. For example, one can 
envision a service provider maintaining two sets of secret keys: one to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data items from any attacks on the U-WSP and 
another to protect all types of data from snooping attacks on the network. Depending on 
the security requirements of the data items or client preferences, the service provider can 
choose the set of keys to employ. 
4.5. Application Level Support for the AppCore 
From the application developer’s point of view, ISO-WSP represents a departure 
from existing WSPs. The developer has to consciously split the application program into 
a trusted and an untrusted part. This is a potential drawback for the ISO-WSP architecture 
as the developer will have to expend additional effort while designing a new application. 
Additionally, legacy code can no longer be executed on ISO-WSP without appropriate 
modifications. In this section, we will show that the application developer only needs to 
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carry out some simple steps to design a new application or port a legacy application to 
ISO-WSP. We will also see that these steps fit in naturally with security-aware design of 
web service applications. 
Modifications to the application level software can be classified into two types: 
modifications to data structures and modification to code. We capture these modifications 
by asking the application developer to define an interface, called the Secure Functional 
Interface, to security-sensitive objects that can be used by untrusted components. We first 
describe this interface and then show how modifications to data structures and code can 
be easily effected with the help of this interface. We use Java as the application-level 
programming language to illustrate the modifications to data and code. However, our 
approach is equally applicable to other object-oriented languages.  
4.5.1. Secure Functional Interface: A Restricted Interface for Remote Access 
To understand the need for defining a restricted interface for remote access of 
sensitive objects, consider a payment processing service as described in Figure 11-A. Of 
the data items, it is reasonable to expect that the customer would like to enforce strong 
confidentiality properties on the credit card information (Figure 11-B). In particular, the 
customer does not want the credit card information to be inappropriately stored or 
transferred. Object-oriented languages such as C++ and Java encapsulate data items, 
providing limited protection against inappropriate access. Even in such languages, 
sensitive objects contain functions that allow for retrieval of sensitive information, e.g., 
getter functions that enable objects to be easily plugged into existing web service 
platforms (getCcNum in Figure 11-B). These methods can be invoked by untrusted 
objects to gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, we cannot export the complete 
list of methods supported by the sensitive object to the untrusted object.  
We require the application developer to identify sensitive data items and define a 
restricted interface, called a Secure Functional Interface (SFI), for access by untrusted 
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components. The SFI for a sensitive data item lists all operations on the data item that can 
be performed by untrusted components. The SFI approach assumes that remote access 
function implementations are well-designed, i.e., a remote access function does not return 
sensitive data to the caller or compromise the integrity of sensitive data. Figure 11-C 
presents the SFI for the CreditCard object, which no longer contains the getter functions, 
thereby denying access to sensitive information to the untrusted part of the application.   
Defining SFI is not an undue burden as current language-level features such as the 
protected and private keywords in function signatures already make the developers aware 
of security implications of the function. Defining a SFI is similar to the use of those 
keywords; however, address-space separation between the trusted data items and 
untrusted components provides stronger security guarantees about information exchanges 
between them. 
4.5.2. Modifications to Data Structures 
Based on our definition of SFI, one would assume that application-level data 
structures would be unmodified in ISO-WSP. However, as described in Section 4.4, we 
replace sensitive data items with dummy items that contain tokens. Therefore we have to 
modify the corresponding application-level data structures to include a token field. On 
the untrusted side, we also have to add another field that holds the stub for invoking the 
remote procedure on the trusted side. Adding these fields can be automated: add the 
fields to a class inherited from the class mentioned in the SFI file (Figure 11-E). We refer 





Figure 11. Partial Code Listing for a Payment Processing Service. Code 
generation process uses XSLT templates. Boxed area indicates modifications 
specified by developer. Highlighted areas indicate code reuse. 
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4.5.3. Modifications to Code 
First, by modifying the local application-level data structures, we are invalidating 
the schema for the web service interface (WSDL specification). Therefore, we have to 
modify the local application-level code to use the serializer/deserializer for the annotated 
class instead of the one for the legacy class. Crucially, the remote application-level code 
(a client in the case the service provider uses an ISO-WSP or vice versa) does not have to 
be modified as the Message Splicer in the local ISO-WSP adds these new fields to an 
incoming XML message and strips the fields from an outgoing message. Once again, we 
can use the list of sensitive classes from SFI specifications to configure the Message 
Splicer to strip or add token information to messages. 
Secondly, when an untrusted component accesses functions specified in the SFI, it 
has to be converted into a remote call. This requires two modifications on the untrusted 
side: (a) parameters to the remote call have to be serializable. Most Java classes can be 
serialized by adding “implements serializable” to the class definition. The default 
serialization methods along with automatically generated getters and setters are sufficient 
for serializing and deserializing most classes. Otherwise, the developer will have to write 
custom serializers and deserializers. And (b), the untrusted classes have to be modified to 
call the remote interface in case the sensitive data resides in the trusted part of the 
application. This is easily accomplished by modifying the relevant method to pass the 
arguments along with the token to the trusted part of the application. On the other hand, if 
the data resides in the untrusted part of the application, then the local method is invoked. 
At this point one should note that the untrusted part can modify itself to make a 
local call instead of a remote call. However, this would not affect the confidentiality or 
integrity of sensitive data, as the sensitive data is stored in the trusted part of the 
application.  
On the trusted side, we have to write a remote interface server that handles 
requests from the untrusted part. The server maintains a collection of security-sensitive 
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objects, indexed by their unique identifiers. Upon receiving a request, the server uses the 
unique identifier to retrieve the appropriate instance of the sensitive object. It then makes 
a local call with the arguments provided by untrusted and returns the result. 
One potential weakness in the system is that the trusted part now performs 
operations using data provided by the untrusted part. This may violate the integrity flow 
in the system, as data is flowing from a lower integrity level (untrusted part) to a higher 
integrity level (trusted part). We assume that the trusted code validates all inputs from the 
untrusted part before proceeding with the operation, e.g., by comparing against a local 
copy. 
4.6. Implementation 
We implemented an ISO-WSP prototype based on the Apache Axis2 platform. 
The T-WSP consisted of a WS-Security implementation (WSS4J [2]) and a Message 
Splicer. Accordingly, the configuration files for WS-Security also formed a part of the T-
WSP. The rest of the Axis2 WSP, along with the other WS-* extensions formed the U-
WSP. We modified Axis2 to make remote calls to perform WS-Security related 
processing. Since we used Java, all remote calls were Java RMI calls. This required 
around 100 new and modified lines of code (LOC). We also had to modify the WS-
Security implementation to serialize and deserialize the parameters. Since the WS-
Security configuration files were now a part of the T-WSP, we had to add code to read 
the configuration files. In all, we had to modify or add around 700 LOC. Thus, by adding 
or modifying around 800 LOC, we were able to convert the existing Axis2 WSP into an 
ISO-WSP prototype. We execute the T-WSP as a superuser process and the U-WSP as an 
unprivileged user. The file system permissions of the configuration files of the T-WSP 
are set such that the U-WSP is unable to read or modify them. 
Our implementation of the Message Splicer accepts information about sensitive 
classes in two ways. First, it allows developers to specify XML files that contain 
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serialized versions of an instance of a sensitive data item with dummy values, e.g., a 
credit card data item with an invalid card number. The Message Splicer uses these 
“dummy” values when replacing sensitive objects in incoming messages. It also inserts 
unique tokens when replacing sensitive objects. Secondly, the Message Splicer accepts 
sensitive data items in the form of Document Object Model (DOM) fragments from the 
trusted part of the application. Each fragment possesses unique tokens that are used by 
the Message Splicer when replacing dummy data items with actual content in outgoing 
messages. 
For performance analysis, we implemented a simple payment processing service 
(partial code listing for the service is presented in Figure 11) that accepts order 
information and payment information in the form of a credit card object and returns a 
confirmation string containing a transaction identifier and the amount charged to the card. 
We denoted the credit card information as security-sensitive information. To protect this 
information, the client specifies that the whole request message be encrypted using WS-
Security with the public key of the service provider as the encryption key. In our legacy 
service implementation, the business logic accepts a DOM fragment containing the input 
parameters and deserializes it into Java objects. Next, it calls the charge card function to 
generate a confirmation number. The results are converted into a DOM fragment which is 
then passed on to the WSP for further processing and transmission. 
In the implementation on top of ISO-WSP, the developer first specifies an SFI as 
illustrated in Figure 11-C. We then use our code generator to generate the necessary class 
files (D, E and F listings in Figure 11). We also require the developer to modify legacy 
code and we discuss the number and type of modifications in Section 4.7.3. 
For an incoming request, both the trusted part and the untrusted part of the 
application receive DOM fragments, which are deserialized into Java classes. The trusted 
part registers itself with a Credit Card server that is executing on the T-WSP. The 
untrusted application calls the charge card function using the SFI. Hence, the call is 
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redirected to the Credit Card server on the trusted side (Figure 11-F), which in turn 
invokes the charge card function of the appropriate instance of the credit card class. Once 
the untrusted part gets the confirmation number, it invokes the cleanup method to free the 
credit card object in the trusted part of the application. Finally, the results are converted 
into a DOM fragment and passed on to the U-WSP. 
4.7. Evaluation 
We evaluate ISO-WSP along the design goals mentioned in Section 2.2.1. We 
first discuss the security properties of ISO-WSP and show that the flow of sensitive 
information is limited to trusted parts of the WSP and application. We also show that 
applying the AppCore approach to WSPs reduces software complexity by a factor of 5. 
Next we discuss the performance implications of ISO-WSP and show that it results in a 
manageable overhead of few milliseconds per request. We then evaluate the cost of 
porting legacy applications to the ISO-WSP. 
4.7.1. Security Properties of ISO-WSP 
4.7.1.1 Information Flow Security in ISO-WSP 
Before we discuss information flow security in ISO-WSP, we list the basic 
assumptions and features of ISO-WSP. First, we assume that all sensitive information is 
protected using WS-Security. Furthermore, we assume that sensitive information 
protected using WS-Security cannot be compromised without first compromising the 
security extensions. Secondly, WS-Security processing is carried out in a separate 
protection domain, with the U-WSP being executed as a lower privilege process. 
Therefore, untrusted components cannot indirectly access sensitive data, e.g., they cannot 
change the parameters of security processing. We only have to prevent direct access of 
sensitive information by the U-WSP. 
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Figure 12 presents the flow of information in ISO-WSPs. The Message Splicer is 
the key component that filters the flow of sensitive information by splitting and merging 
flows as needed. To analyze how this process of splitting and merging secures flow of 
sensitive information in contrast to legacy WSPs, we divide the untrusted WSP into two 
categories: 
• Components that operate below WS-Security (WSP Processing–B in Figure 
12): Since these components worked on encrypted or signed data, they did not have 
direct access to sensitive data in legacy WSPs. However, they could indirectly 
compromise flows by modifying security processing parameters, e.g., overwrite 
configuration files or security processing parameters. In ISO-WSP, they execute with 
lower privilege and in a separate protection domain and hence, cannot manipulate 
security processing parameters. 
• Components that operate above WS-Security (WSP Processing–A in Figure 
12): These components had both direct and indirect access to sensitive data in legacy 
WSPs. In ISO-WSP, we replace sensitive data with dummy data items before transferring 
the message back to these components. Hence, these components are deprived of direct 
 
Figure 12. Securing Information Flow in ISO-WSP. The T-WSP replaces security-
sensitive data items with protected data items or dummy data items before passing them 
on to the U-WSP. Secure Functional Interface (SFI) is discussed in Section 4.5.1. 
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access to sensitive data. Previously discussed arguments against indirect access by 
untrusted components are equally applicable to these components. 
4.7.1.2 Software Complexity Reductions  
Our second motivating factor for constructing an ISO-WSP was the increased 
complexity of WSPs. Table 7 compares the software complexity of various WSP 
components and compares them against the T-WSP. We measured two properties: Source 
Lines of Code and McCabe’s Cyclomatic complexity [85]. Empirical studies have shown 
that both measures of software complexity correlate with number of bugs in code [88]. 
We see that the T-WSP is a factor of 5 smaller and simpler than the current 
implementation of the Axis2 WSP, making the T-WSP more amenable to exhaustive 
testing. The small size of the T-WSP also makes it easier to apply static analysis 
techniques for monitoring the flow of information, as described in [96].  
Extensibility of WSPs is a crucial factor in testing and analysis. Since extensions 
can change the behavior of WSPs and since they can be added or configured at run time, 
they complicate the testing process. However, extensions provide useful functionality 
such as support for addressing, transactions and reliability. By extracting a T-WSP and 
retaining the functionality of the legacy U-WSP, ISO-WSP attempts to gain the best of 
both worlds. By limiting extensibility and configurability in the T-WSP, ISO-WSP 
ensures that the testing process is simplified for T-WSP. And by retaining functionality in 
the U-WSP, ISO-WSP ensures that developers will still be able to use and configure 
extensions according to their needs. 
Table 7. Comparison of Source Lines of Code (SLOC) and McCabe's 
Cyclomatic Complexity (MCC) of the T-WSP and the Axis2 WSP along with its 
extensions. All numbers were generated using the JavaNCSS tool [11].  
Module Axis2 Extensions WS-Security WSP-Total T-WSP 
SLOC 23,580 70,350 16,900 110,830 19,360 




Limitations. We would like to note that the ISO-WSP is vulnerable to Denial of 
Service attacks, wherein the U-WSP either corrupts messages or does not invoke the T-
WSP for security processing. While this affects the availability of the service, it does not 
compromise the confidentiality or integrity of security-sensitive information. 
ISO-WSP can be enhanced with Trusted Computing hardware [25][24] and 
application level support for Trusted Computing, e.g, Integrity Measurement Architecture 
[97], to provide additional, desirable security properties such as integrity of software 
stack at load time and remote attestation. 
4.7.2. Performance of ISO-WSP 
Our experimental setup consisted of two machines, each with Pentium-4 3.0 GHz 
processors with 1 GB RAM, running Linux kernel 2.6.15. The machines were connected 
via a 100 MBps switch. We used Axis2 version 1.1 and WSS4J version 1.5.1 running on 
top of Apache Tomcat 4.1.31.  
There are three sources of overhead in the ISO-WSP. First, since the security-
sensitive parts of the WSP and application are separated from the rest of the application, 
there is the added cost of remote calls. Related to this is the cost of serializing and 
deserializing data items for remote calls. Finally, there is the cost of performing message 
splicing operations. 
To estimate the remote call overhead (Java RMI in our case), we use a simple 
echo application with the client and server running on the same machine. Figure 13 
presents the results of our experiments. We see that round trip times increased linearly 
with message sizes, at the rate of about 0.5 ms per kilobyte. For message sizes less than 8 
KB, round trip time was less than 1 millisecond which is negligible when compared to 




In the ISO-WSP architecture, we have to transfer SOAP messages between the U-
WSP and the T-WSP. This involves converting SOAP messages in DOM format to byte 
array format and vice versa. To estimate these costs, we used an XML data set from the 
XMLBench Document Model Benchmark [33]. We evaluated the cost of serializing and 
deserializing the DOM representation of the data set for two XML parsers, the AXIOM 
pull parser used in the Axis2 WSP (and the U-WSP) and the default Xerces parser 
configuration used in the T-WSP. At this point, we want to reiterate that we only want an 
estimate of the costs of serializing and deserializing SOAP messages. We are not 
attempting to rigorously analyze the performance of the XML parser. Figure 14 compares 
the performance of the various parsers on the data ser. We found that combined 
serializing and deserializing costs for small to medium sized XML files (~10 kilobytes) 
to be less than 4 ms. However, the combined costs for the largest XML file in the dataset 
(36 KB) was about 14 ms (omitted from the figure for clarity). 
We do not perform similar microbenchmarks for estimating message splicing 
costs and application-level serializing and deserializing costs because they are closely 
dependent on the application-level data structures. Rather, we measure these costs as a 
part of a concrete web service implementation. 
 
Figure 13. Remote Call Overhead. Java RMI Round Trip Time vs. Message Size 
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We use the payment processing web service described earlier (Section 4.5) to 
evaluate the end-to-end overhead imposed by the ISO-WSP architecture. We found that 
using ISO-WSP increased the average response time from 40.3 ms to 47.9 ms. To 
accurately characterize the overheads imposed by ISO-WSP, we also measured the time 
spent in each stage of the ISO-WSP. To do so, we instrumented the U-WSP and T-WSP 
to record the time (at microsecond granularity) at each stage of processing. From the 
results (Figure 15), we see that the overhead of the additional stages is about 8.8 ms. 
However, the ISO-WSP implementation as a whole is only 5.2 ms slower than the Axis2 
WSP. We found that this is because the Axis2 WSP uses the pull-based AXIOM parser 
whereas the T-WSP in our implementation uses the default Xerces parser configuration. 
Since WS-Security processing typically involves parsing the whole message (for full 
message signatures or encryption), the performance of WS-Security with pull-based 
parsers suffers. However, as expected, the AXIOM parser is faster when serializing and 
deserializing SOAP messages. 
The rest of the costs (~ 2.4 ms) are distributed in the application-level code. These 
include the cost for two RMI calls from the untrusted part to the trusted part (~0.8 ms): 
one for charging the credit card and another for cleaning up the state in the trusted part. 
 
Figure 14. Performance Comparison of Parsers 
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The second major cost arises because the SOAP message now has to be additionally 
deserialized on the trusted side (~1.5 ms). 
Based on the microbenchmarks and the results for the payment processing web 
service, we can see that ISO-WSP introduces overheads of the order of a few 
milliseconds per request. While this might seem excessive, typical web service 
invocation time ranges from 0.5 seconds to a few seconds [77]. More importantly, one 
should note that ISO-WSP is invoked only during the exchange of sensitive information. 
When exchanging non-sensitive information, ISO-WSP still uses the legacy WSP, 
thereby maintaining the performance of the legacy WSP.  
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.3, ISO-WSP is designed such that WS-
Security processing can still be performed in the U-WSP. Ideally, the service provider 
would provide stronger security guarantees when the T-WSP is involved (e.g., protection 
from potential compromise of large U-WSP). By careful design of web service interfaces, 
exchange of sensitive information can be separated from performance critical operations. 
For example, a real-time stock quote service can export two interfaces: an authentication 
interface that accepts an account password and returns a session identifier and a querying 
interface that accepts the session identifier and returns stock quotes. And instead of 
 
Figure 15. Comparison of security processing costs for an incoming message. All 




providing a single public key, the service provider exports two public keys: one for the 
authentication interface (AI key) and another for the querying interface (QI key). Since 
the authentication interface involves exchange of account password, this stage is 
processed using the AI key and the T-WSP. Once account password has been validated, 
information exchanges for retrieving quotes can be carried out using the QI key and the 
U-WSP, thereby limiting the performance impact of ISO-WSP.  
To illustrate the effectiveness of such an approach, we measured the performance 
of our ISO-WSP implementation by varying the ratio of requests that have enhanced 
security requirements. We used three configurations of the payment processing service in 
our experiments: one that relies on plain text communication, one that uses WS-Security 
and one that uses T-WSP and a trusted credit card processor, as described at the start of 
Section 4.6. The maximum throughput of the web service implementation in each case 
was 252, 43, and 28 requests per second respectively. However to gauge the effect of 
using T-WSP only for a subset of the web server interface, we queried the different 






























Figure 16. Comparison Web Service Throughput with a mix of differing 
Security Configurations. Interpretation of configuration: WS-Security + Plain at 1, 
implies that 1% of calls were made to the WS-Security-enabled implementation and 
99% of calls were made to the Plain text implementation. 
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security properties. Figure X summarizes our results. When a portion of the interface uses 
plain text communication, we see that ISO-WSP underperforms the traditional secure 
configuration of WS-Security by around 25%, which drops down to 4% when just 1% of 
the calls require increased security guarantees. However, if all interfaces require the use 
of WS-Security, we see that securing a portion of the interface with T-WSP has low 
overheads (7% overhead when 10% of calls are secured with T-WSP).  
4.7.3. Cost of Porting Application-level Code 
To port an existing web service implementation to ISO-WSP, a developer has to 
modify or add code to existing code in four places: First the developer has to define SFIs 
for sensitive objects. SFI size is dependent on the number of functions that are exported 
by the sensitive object. On a related note, the developer has to add information about 
dummy objects to the configuration file, e.g., reference to a file containing a dummy 
object. 
Second, the developer has to change the serializer and deserializer in the trusted 
and untrusted parts of the application to account for modified data items (Section 4.5.2). 
The number of modifications depends on the data binding framework used by the 
application, e.g., using Castor [24] as the data binding framework necessitates modifying 
just 2 LOC: one to modify the settings of the serializer and one to modify the type of 
object being serialized.  
Third, the developer has to add code for cleaning up trusted objects. This involves 
adding just one LOC. And finally, the developer has to modify the trusted part of the 
application to interact with the T-WSP. Currently we use hand written code to bind the 
application to the T-WSP and hence this is a relatively major part of the porting process.  
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 Table 8 presents the number of lines added or modified when porting two 
applications, the aforementioned Payment Processor service and our port of the RUBiS 
benchmark [18]. We can see that we have to add or modify few tens of lines of code, 
which amounts to a small fraction of the application. Moreover, a majority of these 
modifications are required to the interface the T-WSP with the application level code. 
Given the standard nature of the code, we feel that code generation techniques, similar to 
the WSDL2Java code generators of Axis2 [4], can be employed to further reduce the 
number of modifications required. 
4.7.4. Revisiting Design Goals 
Once again, of the five design goals, we evaluated security properties, complexity 
reductions and performance overheads in the previous subsections. This section evaluates 
the design and implementation of ISO-WSP with respect to the other two requirements.  
Reuse of Legacy Software. ISO-WSP reuses legacy WSP for handling non-
sensitive or protected sensitive information. For handling sensitive information, ISO-
WSP requires that the legacy WSP be modified to call the T-WSP. By doing so, ISO-
WSP not only reuses legacy software, but it also retains most of the functionality of 
legacy WSPs. 
Reuse of Interfaces. ISO-WSP relies on the legacy U-WSP to interact with the 
external entities. Additionally, ISO-WSP contains a Message Splicer which ensures that 
any changes to the data format (e.g., adding tokens) are not visible to external entities. 
Table 8. Number of Lines of Code added or modified when porting legacy 









Payment Processor 2 5 3 32 40 (13% a) 
RUBiS [18] 6 9 12 28 49  (<1%) 
a Payment processor service does not have the actual payment processing code. Hence, the 
percentage value is not truly representative. 
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Therefore ISO-WSP ensures that the web service interface is retained. However the 
interface between the middleware and the application level code is modified in two ways: 
data format changes and instead of one, there are two application-level components per 
web service request or response. We showed with the use of SFI that these two changes 
can be incorporated into existing application level code with minimal modifications.  
4.8. Discussion 
4.8.1. Applicability to Other WSPs 
We used Axis2 to present a proof-of-concept implementation of ISO-WSP. 
However, our approach is applicable to other WSPs such as Microsoft .NET. The 
procedure for adding a T-WSP to a legacy WSP is simple: first, the legacy WSP has to be 
modified to transmit and receive XML messages during processing of a SOAP message. 
Since WSPs are designed to handle XML messages, we can easily add such functionality 
or borrow functionality for other parts of the WSP. Secondly, we need to add modules 
that serialize and deserialize parameters passed to, or received from the T-WSP. This 
stage can be potentially time consuming depending on the programming language 
employed. Since Java provided serializers and deserializes are sufficient for most classes, 
we did not have trouble developing a T-WSP for Axis2. 
4.8.2. Cost of Splitting Applications 
The payment processing service example involved simple information flow 
between sensitive and non-sensitive objects – cc.verify(...) and cc.chargeCard(...) were 
the only functions that had to be invoked. This reduces cost of interaction between trusted 
and untrusted parts of the application. Secondly, having a clearly separation between 
sensitive and non-sensitive objects simplifies the process of splitting applications into 
trusted and untrusted part. 
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However, applications such as a Health Level 7 hub (HL7 hub) [10] contain more 
complex interactions between sensitive and non-sensitive information. These applications 
require greater effort to split, more LOC modified due to larger number of sensitive 
objects. Additionally, the resulting split is expensive as there will be more remote calls 
between the untrusted and trusted parts. Alternatively, one can treat the complete 
application as trusted and execute it in on top of the U-WSP. In such as case, the 
application has to be modified to interact with the T-WSP – few LOC. There is only one 
remote call from the untrusted to the trusted part of the application to trigger the 
execution of the application. The alternate approach, while minimizing the cost of porting 
and executing the application on the ISO-WSP, results in a larger trusted component. We 
feel that this tradeoff is dependent on the application-level code complexity. If the 
application-level code is amenable to exhaustive testing or formal analysis [96] (of the 
order of few thousand lines of code), then it might be easier to treat the complete 
application as trusted. Otherwise, we have to split the application to improve its security 
properties and incur the added costs of splitting.  
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CHAPTER 5  
END-TO-END SECURITY IN THE PRESENCE OF  
MISBEHAVING INTERMEDIATE SERVICES 
 
Service Oriented Computing standards such as SOAP (Simple Object Access 
Protocol) and WSDL (Web Services Description Language) have enabled the 
development of a new class of services and applications called Web service compositions 
(also referred to as composition for brevity). Web service compositions are distributed 
applications that aggregate content from multiple sources and add value through 
composition, annotation and refinement (e.g., electronic prescription system in Figure 17). 
However, these distributed applications also exacerbate the general trade-off between the 
growing functionality from many components and the weakening of end-to-end system 
properties such as performance, reliability, security, privacy, and trust, which are 
dependent on the weakest link of the many components. 
We first discuss the flow of information in web service compositions. Using an 
electronic prescription system, we present the need for an end-to-end security framework. 
Next, we present WS-FESec [105], a fine-grained, end-to-end framework aimed at 
preserving integrity and confidentiality in composite web services. We then evaluate the 
security properties and the performance implications of WS-FESec. We show that WS-
FESec is flexible enough to support the lattice model of secure information flow while 
incurring manageable performance overheads of few tens of milliseconds per encryption 
or signature. 
5.1. Information Flow in Web Service Compositions 
In a simple web service invocation, there is a single flow between the service 
provider and the client. Once again, we assume that this flow is composed of two types of 
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data items: security-sensitive and security-insensitive data items. In the case of simple 
flows, protocols such as SSL and TLS can be used to protect security-sensitive data 
items. On the contrary, in web service compositions, information flows via multiple 
intermediate services before reaching the final consumer. We use an electronic 
prescription system to illustrate the problem of securing information flow in web service 
compositions. 
5.1.1. Electronic Prescription Application 
Electronic prescription systems [45][9] are an example of relatively 
straightforward e-commerce applications with significant security requirements. As the 
starting point, the physician writes an electronic prescription, stores it in a trusted 
prescription store, and provides the patient with a prescription identifier. The patient then 
provides this identifier to a pharmacy, which retrieves the prescription and fills it. The 
pharmacy also contacts the health plan providers to determine the deductible and excess 
costs not covered by insurance and charges the patient accordingly.  
 
Figure 17. Electronic Prescription Application. Patient contacts aggregator to identify 
the closest, cheapest or fastest delivery pharmacies. Shaded boxes indicate data items 
stored by each entity. Broken line indicates personal interaction. 
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We add an aggregator service, one that attempts to provide a patient with better 
choice of suppliers, to an electronic prescription application. The modified application is 
described in Figure 17. Sites such as New York State Attorney General’s Office 
Prescription Drug Website (www.nyagrx.org) allow a patient to compare prices of 
individual drugs at various pharmacies. An enhanced aggregator service can be designed 
to compare costs of complete prescriptions and additional non-prescription drugs that a 
patient might need. Additionally, it could also allow a patient to select pharmacies based 
on drug availability, delivery mechanism and proximity. In short, the aggregator service 
provides the patient with an easy way to compare pharmacies with minimal increase in 
costs, in terms of both time and money.  
5.1.2. Security Requirements in an Electronic Prescription Application 
The following information is exchanged between the physician, patient, and the 
component services: 
• ERx: Electronic prescription (described in Table 9). 
Table 9. Structure of an Electronic Prescription [9]. Superscripts indicate classes 
of information. Pt: Patient, Phy: Physician, Pharm: Pharmacy, Ins: Insurance, Drug: 
Drug. 
Field Description 
DemographicsPt Patient information, including Optional Insurance 
information 
Clinical decision 
support rules basePt 
Information to pharmacies to make a case-by-case decision 
on selecting drugs 
Other InformationPt More Patient details like allergies 
PrescriberPhy Clinician Information 
PharmacyPharm Information for a selected Pharmacy.  
PrescriptionDrug List of Drugs 
Drug DictionaryDrug More information about drugs 
Drug ReferenceDrug Optional. Information for Patient or pharmacist, e.g., patient 
ed. materials  
Formulary Info.Ins Detailed Insurance Information 




• NRx: Non-prescription drug list. 
• FinInfo: Patient’s financial information such as bank account number or 
credit card number. 
• Addr: Pickup or delivery address of patient. 
• PharmReply: A pharmacy’s reply to pricing queries, or purchase orders. It 
contains pricing information and delivery options. 
The security requirements are as follows: 
Conf-1. Availability of complete prescription should be limited to patient, 
physician, pharmacy that fills the prescription and the patient’s insurance company. 
Conf-2. Patient’s financial information is available only to the pharmacy that 
fills the prescription. 
Int-1. Only the physician is allowed to modify a prescription. The pharmacist 
filling the prescription would also like source verification of the prescription to detect 
fraudulent or inappropriate prescriptions. Therefore, this also doubles as an NRO 
requirement. 
Int-2. The cost of filling a prescription, as specified by a pharmacy service 
(in PharmReply), cannot not be modified by any other service. 
The above described security requirements restrict access to data. However, the 
electronic prescription application also has usability requirements that allow the 
aggregator service and the various pharmacies to provide a value added service. The 
requirements are: 
Usab-1. For price comparison, pharmacies are allowed to look at the list of 
drugs in the prescription, Drug class in Table 9. Care should be taken to avoid 
compromising Conf-1: all pharmacies should not have access to complete prescription 
information as that would identify the patient. 
Usab-2. The aggregator service must be allowed to look at the delivery address 
(coarse grained information, e.g., zip codes) to identify nearby pharmacies. 
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Usab-3. The aggregator service must be allowed to look at the total cost of the 
prescription to filter pharmacies based on price. 
Usab-4. The aggregator service can be allowed to look at non-prescription 
drugs to allow the user to interactively select appropriate type and dosage. 
Usab-5. The aggregator service may be allowed to modify the total cost of non-
prescription drugs, and therefore, the cost of the order, to account for changes in patient 
choice. This feature enables the aggregator service to respond immediately to changes in 
patient choice, e.g., increase the number of units of a non-prescription drug. 
Open Environment. Since the pharmacy services reside on the Internet, the 
patient typically does not know of all online pharmacies. Also, the aggregator services 
are known only to the patient and are not fully trusted by either the patient or the 
prescription store. 
5.2. Need for Fine-Grained, End-to-End Security Framework 
From the electronic prescription application, we see that web service 
compositions can operate in an open environment. They require mechanisms to enforce 
fine-grained confidentiality and integrity policies, e.g., a policy that distinguishes 
between different parts of a prescription, non-prescription drugs, shipping address and 
financial information. 
Web service compositions also require mechanisms to enforce end-to-end 
confidentiality policies, e.g., a policy specified by either the patient or the pharmacy that 
selectively allows the aggregator service read access to portions of message exchanged 
between them. The unencrypted portions of messages between the pharmacies and the 
patient require an end-to-end integrity policy to prevent the aggregator service from 




Since the WS-Security specification supports fine-grained encryption and 
signatures, it can be used to enforce fine-grained security policies. However, WS-
Security requires the developers to specify low level policies. We would like a higher 
level abstraction where the developer groups data items in a message based on 
confidentiality and integrity requirements, which are then transformed into WS-Security 
policies. 
The WS-Security specification does not handle open environments well. First, 
WS-Security needs a shared secret between the source and the recipient to distribute the 
encryption keys. In an open environment, establishing a shared secret between a source 
and each and every potential recipient is not always feasible, e.g., the prescription store 
does not know of all pharmacies at message generation time.  
Secondly, for every encryption key, WS-Security uses a single key reference (e.g., 
a WS-SecureConversation context [28] or encryption key encrypted with the public key 
of the recipient). Therefore, if multiple recipients have to be able to decrypt the message, 
all of them have to understand the same key reference. This in turn implies that all of 
them possess the same shared secret. Once again, this is not feasible in an open 
environment as services execute at different security levels, e.g., from the patient’s 
perspective, atmost one pharmacy executes with a higher security clearance and is 
allowed to view patient information in the prescription. Therefore, we need a framework 
that can support end-to-end security properties in open environments. 
5.3. Overview of WS-FESec 
WS-FESec employs a fine-grained approach to maintain end-to-end 
confidentiality and integrity in composite web services. WS-FESec relies on fine-grained, 
field-level digital signatures to allow for value-adding modifications (e.g., composition, 
annotation and pruning) by intermediate web services. Digital signatures satisfy the NRO 
property and also allow recipients to verify the source of data items in a message. 
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Similarly, WS-FESec relies on field-level encryption to allow for fine-grained access to 
confidential data. WS-FESec is end-to-end because digital signatures can be verified by 
any recipient and does not depend on the correct behavior of intermediate services. 
Similarly, by limiting the encryption-key distribution to authorized services, WS-FESec 
also enforces end-to-end confidentiality of data items. WS-FESec currently does not 
currently address issues of availability or denial of service attacks. 
Let WSS be a data-generating source web service. Let WSR represent the recipients 
of this data. WSR consists of other web services, web service applications or end-users. 
WSS wants to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the generated data. We assume 
that a web service message consists of distinct fields. These fields are then grouped 
according to the confidentiality and integrity policy for the web service. Each policy 
specifies groups of fields that have same confidentiality requirements (ConfG) or 
integrity requirements (IntG). Each group of data items is then encrypted or signed 
separately before transmission. Section 5.4 describes the composition of IntGs and 
discusses the signature mechanisms. Section 5.5 describes the construction of ConfGs 
and the encryption and key distribution mechanisms. Section 5.6 discusses the interaction 
between confidentiality and integrity requirements. In each of these sections, we also 
discuss how the WS-Security specification or implementation can be augmented to 
support WS-FESec. We use the WSS4J implementation [2] in this dissertation.  
5.4. Addressing Integrity Requirements 
In this section, we assume that WSS does not have a confidentiality policy. This is 
common for services that deal with publicly available information, e.g., a delayed stock 
quote service. We assume an open environment, i.e., there is no restriction on who can be 
a member of WSR. Based on our discussion in Section 5.1.1, we need a framework that is 
flexible enough to permit value adding modifications like pruning and annotation by 
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intermediate services, while at the same time minimizing the damage to the integrity of 
the original data items.  
We achieve integrity protection in three steps: First, we require the message 
originator(e.g., the web service developer) to specify Integrity Groups on the outgoing 
message. Next, we sign these groups individually before transmitting the message. 
Finally, we allow the recipient to specify integrity policies that can work with invalid or 
missing signatures in messages.  
5.4.1. Composition of Integrity Groups 
The idea of Integrity Groups (IntG) is to identify portions of the message that are 
independent from the rest of the message. This process is carried out by the designer or 
the developer of a web service. By doing so, we split a message into multiple groups, 
each of which can be processed separately, without loss of integrity, by the intermediate 
web services or by the final recipient. 
For example, consider an auction listings web site that supports a querying 
interface. A query can return multiple results that can be filtered by an intermediate web 
service. If each result is treated as a separate IntG and signed independently, then 
intermediate web services can drop some results without affecting the integrity of the 
other results.  
5.4.2. Signing IntGs 
WS-FESec allows the service developer and user to think in terms of integrity 
groups instead of writing detailed policies. WS-FESec converts these integrity groups in 
to configuration parameters for a WS-Security implementation (WSS4J in our case). WS-
Security allows for messages to be signed with either digital signatures or Keyed message 
authentication code (HMAC). Digital signatures additionally satisfy the NRO 
requirement. However, they are computationally expensive. HMAC is cheaper than 
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digital signatures, but requires a key distribution infrastructure and cannot be used to 
satisfy NRO requirement. Key distribution for HMAC signatures is discussed in greater 
detail in Section 3.2.2. 
5.5. Addressing Confidentiality Requirements 
Our framework utilizes fine-grain encryption to satisfy confidentiality 
requirements in web service compositions. As data items are now encrypted with a secret 
key, key distribution now becomes important. Encrypting data items also forces us to 
rethink the way confidentiality groups are composed. We first address the composition of 
confidentiality groups and then discuss key distribution mechanisms.  
5.5.1. Composition of Confidentiality Groups.  
Confidentiality group (ConfG) is a set of fields grouped by together 
confidentiality requirements. ConfG differs from IntG in two ways: first, ConfG does not 
indicate independence of data items from the rest of the message. Rather, it indicates that 
a group of items is at a different security level from the rest of the message. Secondly, 
IntG allows a field to appear in multiple groups. On the other hand, fields can appear in at 
most one ConfG as each ConfG contains values of fields. Therefore, if a field appears in 
two ConfGs, it can lead to two different values for the same field. 
Therefore, each ConfG is now encrypted with a separate encryption key 
(henceforth referred to as ConfG Keys). The outgoing message contains all the encrypted 
data items. Confidentiality requirements are satisfied by limiting the availability of the 
decryption keys amongst the recipients. 
5.5.2. Key Distribution  
Key distribution, for both HMAC and encryption, is predicated on two main 
factors. First, it depends on the existence of a secret context (or a shared secret) between 
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the source and the recipient. Secondly, a source’s knowledge of the potential recipients 
also affects key distribution.  
5.5.3. Establishing Secret Context between WSS and WSR  
Secret contexts are used to wrap or refer to ConfGs Keys. Since the secret context 
is shared between the source and the recipient, it does not have to be transmitted over the 
network. Public keys, WS-SecureConversation contexts [28] and registration time secrets 
(e.g., passwords) are examples of secret contexts.  
5.5.4. Source Web Service’s (WSS) knowledge of Recipients (WSR)  
Since the encryption keys have to be kept a secret between the source web service 
and each of the recipients, the source web service’s knowledge of recipients becomes an 
important factor in the design of a confidentiality framework. Key management is easier 
and more efficient if WSS knows of all members in WSR. In such a scenario, we just use 
the secret context (or a key derived from the secret context) to encrypt the appropriate 
ConfG keys and transmit the encrypted keys with the message. 
In the more general case, where the recipients might not be known at message 
generation time, we transmit the encrypted message, but require the recipient to call back 
the source web service to receive the key. When the recipient calls back, the WSS might 
require the recipient to authenticate itself before wrapping the keys with the secret 
context and transmitting them. 
5.5.5. Encrypting ConfGs 
We cannot directly use WS-Security to encrypt messages or distribute keys 
because of key distribution problems mentioned earlier (Section 5.2). The WS-Security 
specification has to be enhanced in two ways to support WS-FESec. First, WS-Security 
needs an on-demand key distribution mechanism. We do so by extending the TokenType 
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attribute of SecurityTokenReference element of the WS-Security specification [15] with a 
new type, CallbackReference. The CallbackReference type is illustrated in Figure 18.  
Secondly, WS-Security uses a single KeyInfo structure per secret key (for 
encryption or HMAC). This assumes that all services that need access to the secret key 
share the same secret. The assumption does not hold in web service compositions, where 
recipients operate at different security levels and therefore might not share a secret. We 
augment the WS-Security specification to explicitly allow for multiple KeyInfo structures 
per secret key. This implies that a secret key can be wrapped in multiple ways in a single 
message, thereby allowing recipient services to independently access the protected 
contents. 
It is straightforward to use this modified WS-Security specification to encrypt 
messages given the ConfGs and the set of authorized recipients. 
5.6. Interaction between Integrity and Confidentiality Requirements 
In cases where WSS would like to enforce an integrity policy in addition to a 
confidentiality policy, WS-FESec applies the confidentiality policy before the integrity 
policy. This order of application allows recipients at lower security levels to verify 
signatures that are computed over higher security level data, e.g., the aggregator service 
in the electronic prescription application can verify the authenticity of the prescription 
without having to access the actual prescription. 
• /fesec:CallbackReference/@URI 
This lists the URI that the recipient has to call and authenticate itself to receive the key.  
• /fesec:CallbackReference/@fesec:AuthMechanism 
This contains the authentication techniques supported by the URI. Allowed values include 
UsernameToken or BinarySecurityToken (refers to X.509 certificates or WS-
SecureConversation contexts).  
• /fesec:CallbackReference/@fesec:MsgID 
This is a unique identifier for the message, that identifies the decryption key. 
Figure 18. Details for the CallbackReference Type 
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However, this limits the granularity of signatures to that of the encrypted 
elements. WS-Security allows for complex data structures to be encrypted as a block, 
replacing the entire data structure with a single encrypted field. Therefore, the granularity 
of signatures is limited by the confidentiality policy. However, this problem can be easily 
bypassed, if necessary, by enumerating the elements in the data structure instead of 
specifying the top level data structure in ConfGs. 
5.7. Evaluation 
5.7.1. Security Properties of WS-FESec 
 
Web Service Compositions and Lattice Model: Security levels and clearances 
in web service compositions can be modeled as a lattice [52]. In a web service 
composition, data producing web services assign security levels to objects. Security 
clearances are authorization tokens provided by the data producing web services or by 
trusted third parties. If the component web services in a composition agree on a uniform 
security classification, then security levels of the data items form a lattice. But a uniform 
classification is not always possible in an open environment. Although there are many 
candidate lattices, they all share the lowest classification level: Public. To simplify our 
lattice model, we introduce a High classification that dominates all other security 
classifications. Using these two classification levels, we combine individual lattices to 
generate a single lattice. This simple model does not make any additional assumptions 
about prior knowledge of other web services at data generation time and is therefore 
suited for the open environment of web services. 
WS-FESec is designed to support the lattice model of multi-level security. Each 
security level is represented by a ConfG as described in Section 5.5.1. Each ConfG is then 
encrypted as specified by WS-FESec (Section 5.5.5). Security clearances are handled 
using authentication and authorization mechanisms. Secret contexts, as described in 
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Section 5.5.3 give some examples of authentication and authorization mechanisms.  Only 
the encrypted messages are distributed to the intermediate services. Web services with 
security clearances either query the data producing web service to retrieve the key or use 
their part of the secret context to retrieve the keys from the message. A web service gets 
keys for all ConfG’s that its security clearance level dominates. And since a single web 
service might have multiple clearance levels, one for each data producing web service, it 
might have to query multiple services to realize its clearance level. Effectively, this 
mechanism allows us to limit the access of intermediate services at a data item 
granularity. 
End-to-End Confidentiality for the Electronic Prescription Application. We 
now briefly go over how WS-FESec satisfies the security and usability requirements 
mentioned in Section 5.1.2. The data items exchanged in the electronic prescription 
application can be categorized using a single, linearly ordered lattice (in increasing 
order): Public, Semi-Private and Private. The Public class includes information on non-
prescription drugs, coarse-grained patient address, pharmacy address and delivery 
options. The Semi-Private class includes prescription drug information and anonymized 
insurance information. The Private class contains patient and physician information and 
financial data.  
Each class of data is signed individually to satisfy fine-grained integrity 
requirements (Int-1, Int-2). Public data is not encrypted whereas the Semi-Private and 
Private data are encrypted with separate encryption keys. Access to data by the various 
services is controlled by limiting the distribution of the encryption keys. By transmitting 
Public data in plain-text format, we allow the aggregator service to look at pricing and 
delivery information to provide value added services (Usab-2 to Usab-5). 
Based on the confidentiality requirements (Conf-1, Conf-2), initially, only the 
physician (and by extension, the trusted store) and the patient (and the patient 
application) require access to Private and Semi-Private data. This is achieved by the 
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physician providing the encryption keys during personal interaction with the patient. To 
satisfy the usability requirement for the pharmacies (Usab-1), the trusted store provides 
the key for semi-private information to all authorized pharmacies. We assume the 
existence of an authentication infrastructure as described in [45].  
Finally, when the patient decides to fill the prescription, the patient application 
provides the encryption key for Private data (encrypted with the public key of the 
pharmacy) to the appropriate pharmacy. During the whole process, the aggregator service 
and all pharmacies, except one, do not have access to confidential patient information. 
However, at the same time, they have access to enough information to provide a useful, 
pricing service to the patient. 
5.7.2. Performance 
We use a prototype implementation on top WSS4J to understand the performance 
implications of using WS-FESec. We implemented a simple Stock Quote service, that 
exports two interfaces: a delayed quote service that transmits stock quotes in plaintext 
and a real-time interface that encrypts stock price and transmits the rest of the contents 
(company name, time last updated, volume traded, etc…) in plain text. Each interface 
accepts an array of symbols and returns an array of stock quotes. The whole setup was 
then executed on two 3-GHz Pentium-4 machines with 1 gigabyte of RAM each, 
connected via a gigabit network. The machines run Linux kernel 2.4.27 and Apache Axis 
1.4 along with WSS4j 1.5.1 on Jakarta Tomcat 4.1.31. 
We ran three sets of experiments, evaluating the performance of fine-grained 
signature, fine-grained encryption and fine-grained encryption with signatures. For fine-
grained signatures, we signed each quote in the response message separately. For fine-
grained encryption, we encrypted each stock price individually. For fine-grained 
encryption with signatures, we first encrypted each price of each stock before signing the 
resultant quote. In each set of experiments we compare the performance of WS-FESec 
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against coarse-grained techniques, i.e., signing or encrypting the message body as a 
whole.  
Figure 19 presents the results for multiple signatures per message. We see that 
signature overhead is about 20 ms per IntG, i.e., per signature. We see such a high cost 
because of the use of expensive public key cryptography for signatures. Figure 20 
presents the results for messages that contain multiple, separately encrypted portions. We 
see that encryption overhead is about 22 ms per encryption key. Symmetric key 
encryption is as expensive as signatures because we use RSA to wrap the encryption key. 
We use two levels of encryption: a single channel mode where all stock prices are 
encrypted with the same key and a multi-channel mode where each stock price in the 
message is encrypted with a different key, thereby simulating multiple levels of security 
in the same message. Though the single-channel mode and full body encryption both use 
a single key, single channel mode is more expensive (about 5 ms per quote) because WS-
Security has to parse the XML document to locate elements for encryption. Combining 
signatures and encryption gave us similar results, with the overhead amounting to about 
45 ms per quote in the multi-channel mode which is expected because encryption and 



























WS-FESec: 1 Sig per Quote
 
Figure 19. Performance with Multiple Signature per Message 
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While a cost of few tens of milliseconds per signature or encryption might seem 
expensive at first, WS-FESec allows for services to be combined in novel ways in an 
open environment without compromising the security of information flow. For example, 
fine-grained encryption of prescriptions allows for an aggregator service as described in 
Section 5.1.1. We also expect encryption costs to decrease significantly with the use of 
WS-SecureConversation [28] as it can function without expensive public key operations.  
5.7.3. Interaction with Composition Languages 
Composition languages such as BPEL4WS [5] assume that there is an underlying 
security mechanism such as SSL or WS-Security that maintains the integrity and 
confidentiality of data. Since WS-FESec is layered on top of WS-Security, it can be 
employed as a security mechanism. However, WS-FESec introduces two new wrinkles 
that BPEL4WS developers have to take into account: First, the end-to-end confidentiality 
policy might prevent some data items in a message from being available to the 
intermediate service, e.g., the aggregator service in the electronic-prescription application 
does not have access to prescription. Hence business process decisions in intermediate 






























Figure 20. Multiple Encryptions per message. Single Channel refers to encrypting 
all stock prices in a response message with the same key. In Multi-Channel, every 
stock price in the message is encrypted with a separate key, creating multiple 
security levels in the same message. Encryption keys are wrapped with RSA. 
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This is not a limitation as the confidentiality policy explicitly forbids the intermediate 
web service from looking at the encrypted data items. 
Secondly, WS-FESec depends on WS-Security headers being forwarded to verify 
signatures or locate encryption keys. Hence, BPEL4WS developers might also have to 
propagate WS-Security headers in addition to portions of the message body. BPEL4WS 
tools like Oracle’s BPEL Process Manager already supports this feature, wherein the 
programmer can manipulate WS-Security headers defined in the WSDL document just 
like message body elements. 
5.7.4. Limitations of WS-FESec 
WS-FESec use fine-grained cryptography to satisfy integrity and confidentiality 
requirements in web services. However, there are two situations where fine-grained 
cryptography may be insufficient to preserve integrity or confidentiality: First, WS-
FESec relies on some key data fields remaining untouched by intermediate web services. 
But there are some services that may overwrite all important fields of a message, e.g., 
text to speech services.   
Second, WS-FESec assumes that individual web services are not malicious and 
that they have not been compromised. Therefore, it assumes that any web service that has 
access to confidential data does not distribute the keys or the confidential data to 
unauthorized entities. Although this assumption is routine for static composition, the 
situation is more complex and interesting for dynamic composition. 
We feel that the problems mentioned above can be mitigated with appropriate 
hardware support. Trusted Computing principles (and its web service counterparts such 
as WS-Attestation [116]) such as authenticated booting and remote attestation allow a 
program to gauge the correctness of a remotely executing service and the rest of the 
software stack. This property can be used to check services that completely transform 
data or improve resilience to information leak attacks. 
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CHAPTER 6  
RELATED WORK 
 
Attackers can target flow of sensitive information at three places: on the network, 
at the intermediate nodes and at the end-point nodes. Attacks on the network are 
generally countered with cryptographic techniques. With appropriate authentication and 
key distribution techniques, encryption and signatures can protect web services from 
information leak or information corruption attacks. SSL [61], TLS [53], and https [94] are 
widely used to protect information flows that involve the browser. The WS-* frameworks 
aim to provide security properties such as authentication, confidentiality and integrity for 
web services. WS-Security [15] is a framework for providing quality of protection to 
SOAP messages. WS-Security provides mechanisms for ensuring message integrity, 
confidentiality and authenticity. Web Services Trust Language (WS-Trust) [29] is an 
extension to WS-Security that provides means to establish trust relationships amongst 
differing trust domains. Other frameworks such as WS-SecureConversation and WS-
SecurityPolicy aim to build on top of WS-Security and WS-Trust to provide other 
features such as establishment of a secret context or specify policy assertions. 
These protocols form the basis for protection of information flow on the network 
and AppCores and WS-FESec leverage these protocols to provide stronger security 
guarantees: e.g., AppCore reduces the code base that has access to plain-text sensitive 
data and WS-FESec provides end-to-end security guarantees in web service 
compositions. We now discuss related work in the fields of protecting information from 
vulnerable end point software and misbehaving intermediate nodes. 
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6.1. Protection against Vulnerable Software 
6.1.1. Malicious Software 
Trusted computing [25][24] provides mechanisms like authenticated booting and 
remote attestation to protect against malicious or unauthorized software. The Integrity 
Measurement Architecture [97] extends these mechanisms to include other key 
components of a system’s runtime like dynamically loadable libraries and scripts. The 
WS-Attestation framework [116] leverages trusted computing primitives to protect 
against unknown or malicious software in web services. In conjunction with the above 
described WS-* security frameworks, these techniques protect against a large class of 
software modification attacks. 
However, software vulnerabilities in the TCB can be exploited by attackers to 
gain access to sensitive information. Vulnerabilities in the operating system can be 
exploited to modify the memory of running programs. Vulnerabilities in middleware 
(e.g., libraries, web service platform) and support software (X server, databases) can be 
either used to directly gain access to sensitive data or to modify software with access to 
sensitive data, e.g., by tweaking configuration files. Vulnerabilities in the web service 
itself can be used to bypass access control mechanisms and gain unauthorized access to 
sensitive data. This problem is tackled by restricting the information flow between 
applications and minimizing the number of vulnerabilities in applications in the TCB.   
6.1.2. Reducing Vulnerabilities in Software 
Static analysis and verification techniques can detect bugs and vulnerabilities 
[56][57][59][112]. However, they work best on relatively small code base due to 
scalability problems.  
CCured [87] is a type system that attempts to retrofit security into legacy code. 
CCured extends the type system of C, which allows for static type checking of pointer 
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usage. In cases where static type checking is insufficient, CCured instruments the 
program for dynamic type checking. This approach prevents a large number of pointer-
based attacks such as buffer overflows. Castro et al. [44] use static analysis to instrument 
loads and stores in programs to maintain the integrity of data flow. While these 
techniques detect vulnerabilities or protect against a major class of vulnerabilities (data 
corruption attacks), their scalability, especially to software as large and complex as a 
browser, is still an open question. More recently, Ganapathy et al. [63] have attempted to 
automate the process of retrofitting authorization policy enforcement into existing 
software. Their work involves program analysis of existing software to identify code 
fragments requiring authorization policies. One example is the availability of events in X 
Server window manager: the argument being that remote windows should not be allowed 
access to keyboard or mouse events pertaining to local windows. 
There is also work on defenses against specific types of vulnerabilities, e.g., Lhee 
and Chapin [80] provide an overview of defenses against buffer overflow and format 
string vulnerabilities including tools that rewrite source code or binaries to eliminate or 
trap buffer overflows, SQLRand [40] and AMNESIA [65] are defenses against SQL 
injection attacks. Address space randomization [39], instruction set randomization [36] 
and N-Variant systems [50] are some techniques used to combat arbitrary code execution 
vulnerabilities. 
The above described techniques are orthogonal to the AppCore approach. Since 
the resulting trusted components are small and simple, static analysis techniques are more 
effective. Additionally, since AppCores are invoked only for security-sensitive 
processing, we expect the costs of run-time protection to be lesser when applied to 
AppCore than to complete legacy applications. 
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6.1.3. Refactoring Software 
As mentioned previously (Section 2.6.2), there is considerable work on splitting 
applications and system services to minimize the code that has access to sensitive data, 
e.g., Privilege separation [41][76][90]. Privilege separation works well when the security-
sensitive resources are well-defined (e.g. ports < 1024, RSA private key). This is not the 
case in browsers or web service platforms, where sensitive and non-sensitive data use the 
same resources and have nearly similar information flow paths. Automatic privilege 
separation also does not scale well, especially for complex applications like the browser.  
Substantial research has gone into refactoring and customizing middleware to 
modularize and simplify them. Zhang et al. [118][119] and  Eichberg et al. [55] use 
Aspect Oriented Programming techniques to modularize middleware and then, customize 
it according to the needs of applications. OpenCOM [49] and CompOSE/Q [111], 
amongst others, are examples of reflective middleware that allow for customization of 
middleware to suit the needs of application. ISO-WSP is an attempt at refactoring 
middleware with security as the driving factor. Techniques described in [118][119] are 
applicable to the construction of ISO-WSP. 
The Proxos approach [109] splits the interface between the operating system and 
applications into security-sensitive and security-insensitive parts and uses a smaller and 
simpler operating system to implement the security-sensitive parts of the interface. The 
design goals of the Proxos approach are similar to that of AppCore. However, a large 
number of vulnerabilities exist in current application software and middleware. The 
AppCore approach addresses this issue by additionally simplifying application software 
and middleware.  
6.1.4. Information Flow Restrictions 
By restricting the flow of information between applications, we reduce the impact 
of security vulnerabilities. On a system-wide level, information flow analysis can be used 
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to control communication between processes. Mandatory access control systems such as 
Asbestos [54], capability-based system such as EROS [102] and Authority Based Access 
Control systems such as Polaris [108] aim to control the flow of information or minimize 
the damage due to compromise of software handling sensitive information. The AppCore 
approach is orthogonal to these techniques. In fact, by splitting the flow of information in 
a single application amongst multiple client-side application-level software, AppCore 
allows for more rigorous enforcement of access control. For example, browsers have to 
be allowed to connect to the network, opening up avenues for information leaks. On the 
other hand, the TrustedViewer in BLAC is not expected to communicate over the 
network; it only needs to access the https proxy and a limited number of system services 
such as the display manager. Hence, the access rights of a TrustedViewer can be 
constrained to a greater extent than those of a full-fledged browser. 
XFI [58] takes a novel approach to protect software from untrusted extensions by 
using an untrusted rewriter to instrument the extension with control flow guards and 
memory access guards. The guards are then verified with a small trusted verifier and the 
extension is now deemed safe for execution. Such techniques can be applied to protect 
software such as the browser from malicious extensions. However, the original software 
program can still be exploited if it contains vulnerabilities. 
Tokens used in ISO-WSP by untrusted applications to operate on security-
sensitive data can be viewed as capabilities [114]. The ISO-WSP architecture can be 
considered as retrofitting a capability-based architecture in to WSPs. Protected Data 
Paths (PDP) [78] uses a similar approach to hide sensitive information from untrusted 
application level programs. PDP consists of kernel-level modules that traps I/O calls 
retrieving sensitive data and replaces sensitive data with tokens, thereby preventing 
application level programs from directly accessing them. ISO-WSP not only adds tokens, 
but it also sends back dummy data items with similar structure to the sensitive data item, 
thereby minimizing the changes to existing applications. 
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Information flow analysis can also be used at a finer granularity to identify 
incorrect flows within a single program. Language-based information flow analysis 
[86][96] relies on programmer annotations, called labels, that denote the integrity or 
confidentiality level of a data item. Static analysis is then used to analyze the flow of 
sensitive information in a single program to identify flows that violate the confidentiality 
or integrity policies of the data items. The advantage of such analysis is that it rules out 
most forms of information leaks. However, we have to rely on the programmer to identify 
and annotate all sensitive variables accurately. Static analysis may also not scale to large 
and complex systems like browsers and web service platforms. 
These information flow based techniques will be more effective if we have small 
and simple trusted components. At the same time, smaller components present a smaller 
profile to the attacker, reducing the chances for a successful attack. 
6.1.5. Browser Defenses 
Given the large number of vulnerabilities in the browsers, there is a lot of research 
addressing vulnerabilities in the browser. Research efforts range from interface 
personalization to thwart spoofing attacks [110], password hashing using browser 
extensions to limit the damage done by leaking of passwords [95], rewriting scripts in 
HTML pages to prevent them from exploiting known vulnerabilities [93], and trust 
indicator extensions for browsers to prevent interface spoofing and phishing attacks 
[120]. All these systems assume that the browser can be trusted with high-sensitivity 
information. Given the large number of vulnerabilities (average of 2 per month [21][22]) 
and the types of vulnerabilities (arbitrary code execution, security-system bypass) in 
current browsers, attackers can exploit them to bypass the protection afforded by many of 
these systems. 
The Tahoma architecture [51], on the other hand, assumes that the browser cannot 
be trusted. Tahoma proposes executing browser instances in separate VMs, similar to 
 
93 
VMWare’s Browser Appliance [27]. Additionally, Tahoma requires service providers to 
define a manifest, which is used to control behavior of the browser. Tahoma does not 
address the issue of a multitude of browser extensions (e.g., weather forecast extensions) 
that periodically talk to a site outside the service provider’s manifest. FlowGuard also 
treats the browser as untrusted but it prevents the flow of sensitive information to the 
browser, instead of controlling the behavior of a browser instance that has access to 
sensitive information. Therefore, it does not have to curtail the browser’s functionality. 
6.2. Protection from Misbehaving Intermediate Nodes 
In one-on-one communication, intermediate nodes can be treated as a part of the 
network and the security protocols discussed above will protect the flow of sensitive 
information. However, web service compositions allow for intermediate nodes to look at 
or modify portions of the message. This issue is addressed by the WS-Security 
framework which allows for fine-grained signatures and encryption of message contents. 
This property has been leveraged by distributed Security Authorities [101] and WS-
FESec (Chapter 5) to enforce end-to-end security in web service compositions. 
Reputation based schemes have been used to assess trustworthiness of web 
services and web service compositions [81][83][115]. Quality of service information too 
has been used to select services involved in a composition [84]. WS-Trustworthy [117] 
uses a multi-layered approach to determine trustworthiness of service implementations. 
Unlike reputation-based systems, WS-FESec is narrowly targeted to satisfy end-to-end 
confidentiality and integrity requirements. WS-FESec also guarantees that intermediate 
services, however trustworthy, do not have unauthorized access to data. This prevents 
attacks wherein a service provider builds up trust for some duration before it turns 




Bengetsson and Westerdahl [38] use digital signatures to securely build composite 
web service in a cooperative environment. However, they employ message-level 
signatures which are invalidated at the smallest modification.  
WS-Broker [43] proposes a broker-based architecture to match the client’s 
security requirements with those of component services to generate a secure composition. 
Charfi and Mezini [47] use aspects to generate security conscious web service 
compositions. WS-FESec provides an enforcement mechanism for fine-grained, end-to-
end integrity and confidentiality policies. Therefore, we can reuse techniques described in 
Charfi and Mezini to carry out WS-FESec processing.  
Chafle et al. [46] use decentralized orchestration to provide confidentiality in 
composite web services. A composite web service is broken into separate portions to 
satisfy data flow constraints, confidentiality being one of them. WS-FESec too enforces 
confidentiality policies, but it reuses existing channels of communication, is therefore 
more flexible. WS-FESec opens a new channel only if the recipient and the source 
service do not share a secret context. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION  
7.1. Summary 
Improving end-to-end security properties in web-based applications requires 
addressing end-point software vulnerabilities. Additionally, web service compositions 
require extensions to existing security protocols to maintain end-to-end security 
properties even in the face of misbehaving intermediate service providers. This 
dissertation presented three contributions towards addressing the above mentioned 
problems. 
First, we presented the AppCore approach which splits existing software into two 
a small and simple trusted part that handles sensitive information and a legacy, untrusted 
part that handles non-sensitive information. Not only would the AppCore approach avoid 
many common and well-known vulnerabilities in the legacy software that compromised 
sensitive information, we also postulated that it would greatly reduce the size and 
complexity of the trusted code, thereby making exhaustive testing or formal analysis 
more feasible.  
Secondly, we applied the AppCore approach to two real-world applications: one 
for client-side used in https-based applications and another for web service platforms 
(WSPs) that are used on both the client and server side in Service Oriented Computing. 
The resultant AppCores were smaller and simpler (over 10X simpler for https-based 
applications and 5X simpler for WSPs) and resulted in manageable overheads (few 
hundred milliseconds for https-based applications and few milliseconds for WSPs). We 
also showed that legacy browsers and WSPs can be adapted to interoperate with the 
corresponding AppCores with minimal modifications. Since the resultant AppCores 
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reused legacy interfaces, we also saw that they interact smoothly with remote entities 
executing legacy code. 
Thirdly, to protect communication between clients and service providers, we 
presented WS-FESec, an open, fine-grained, end-to-end framework for preserving 
integrity and confidentiality in web service compositions. WS-FESec leverages WS-
Security for fine-grained encryption and enhances WS-Security to support end-to-end 
security in open environment. We showed that WS-FESec is flexible enough to support 
the lattice model of information flow. Since information flow in web service 
compositions can be modeled as a lattice, WS-FESec can be used to secure information 
flow in web service compositions. WS-FESec can also be easily integrated with 
composition languages like BPEL4WS. In our performance evaluation of WS-FESec, we 
showed that the gains in end-to-end confidentiality and integrity compare favorably with 
few tens of milliseconds of computation overhead. 
Current end-point software does not distinguish between the flow of sensitive and 
non-sensitive information, except for the use of a security protocol library. By splitting 
end-point software into a trusted and untrusted part, the AppCore approach forces end-
point software to be aware of the sensitiveness of information. In contrast to previous 
approaches that limited themselves to automated data flow analysis to split software into 
trusted and untrusted parts, the AppCore approach used manual analysis of the flow of 
sensitive information to further simplify the trusted part. This resulted in significant 
reduction in the complexity of the trusted part compared to purely automated approaches. 
Since the untrusted part is executed in a separate protection domain, common and well-
known vulnerabilities in legacy software such as browsers and WSPs can no longer be 
used to compromise the trusted part, and by extension, any sensitive information flowing 
through the trusted part. By reusing (slightly) modified legacy code to operate on non-
sensitive data items and by retaining the user, programming and remote interfaces, the 
AppCore approach also allows for incremental deployment. 
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WS-FESec provides mechanisms to preserve end-to-end security in open 
environments; specifically it accounts for scenarios where intermediate services operate 
at different security levels and where message recipients not know message generation 
time. These scenarios are common on the Internet, where there are thousands of service 
providers with varying security and trust properties. WS-FESec can be employed in such 
scenarios to enforce end-to-end confidentiality and integrity policies in many useful 
value-added web service compositions such as an electronic prescription system.  
7.2. Future Work 
This dissertation provides techniques to improve end-to-end security properties of 
information flow in web-based applications. However, there are several interesting 
avenues that can be explored to improve the effectiveness of our solutions.  
We saw in Chapters 2-4 that AppCore construction involves manual effort in 
identifying sensitive information, identifying components of software that operate on 
given sensitive information and simplifying the identified components. This is a time-
consuming process, and the problem is exacerbated by the large code bases of existing 
applications. Partially automating the AppCore construction process can provide great 
benefits. A starting point was suggested in PrivTrans [41], where programmer provided 
hints are propagated through the rest of code via data flow analysis to identify all 
sensitive components. We also need tools that simplify the identified components. 
Techniques from program specialization [91][100] can be adapted to tackle this problem. 
The AppCore approach is complementary to many existing techniques targeted at 
reducing vulnerabilities in software (Section 6.1.2). Since AppCores are smaller and 
simpler than legacy code, we expect static analysis techniques to be more effective and 
run-time protection mechanisms to be cheaper when applied to AppCores. An interesting 
area of work is applying these techniques to AppCores and gauging the effectiveness of 
the system as a whole. On the same note, our current implementations of AppCores are 
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not integrated with Trusted Computing-enabled (TC-enabled) hardware. Integrating 
AppCores with TC-enabled hardware will provide interesting and useful security 
properties, e.g., remote attestation.  
Our current implementation of ISO-WSP uses a static split of application-level 
code, through the definition of SFIs. However, the security and performance 
requirements of clients (in case the server runs on ISO-WSP) can vary and they would 
like a mechanism to specify a custom SFI that suits their security-performance tradeoffs. 
To do so, we have to address whether existing applications can be split without any 
developer input. Binary rewriting or byte code rewriting [1] techniques present a 
promising approach to tackle this problem. Alternatively, developers can write code that 
is aware of ISO-WSP, e.g., use label to identify variables and functions that can be split. 
With this input, source code translation techniques can be used to add a layer of 
indirection while accessing these variables and functions. This layer of indirection can be 
used to control the access of variables or behavior of functions in a manner similar to 
meta-objects [75] and meta-interfaces [73]. 
Exploring code generation techniques to convert WS-FESec configurations into 
code performing cryptographic operations is another avenue for further research. 
Currently, developers use static configuration files to control the behavior of 
cryptographic libraries. However, this approach is inflexible with WS-FESec where 
messages might have completely varying signature or encryption patterns. We need a 
mechanism to transform higher level input into fault-tolerant configuration code for 
cryptographic libraries, e.g., IntG and ConfG information for a web service is translated 
into a configuration that allows applications to proceed even in the absence of a few non-
critical signatures, albeit with a lower trust level in the message. 
On a related note, the current WSDL specification, which is used by service 
providers to describe the interface of a service, does not allow service providers to 
publish the security requirements or the security properties of web service 
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implementations. Adding security information to WSDLs, especially information about 
advanced security properties such as SFIs, requires analyzing use cases and coming up 
with a standardized and flexible way to specify the security requirements and properties 
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